Information sharing among firms and cyber attacks by Hausken, Kjell
Information sharing among ﬁrms
and cyber attacksKjell HauskenAbstract
As the Sarbanes-Oxley Act strengthens internal controls, and the government
encourages information sharing, accounting gains signiﬁcance through secure represen-
tation, storage, and transfer of information, and by laying the foundation for assessing
costs and beneﬁts. Information sharing and security investment for two ﬁrms are inverse
U shaped in the aggregate attack, and interlinked through the interdependence and the
ﬁrm’s unit cost of security investment. Both increase in the interdependence (e.g. US
telecommunications industry). With given security investment, social welfare is inverse
U shaped in information sharing. Individual optimization implies free riding. A social
planner is introduced controlling information sharing, security investment, or both, in
simultaneous and two period games. Two period games where the social planner moves
ﬁrst are realistic when the social planner is highly respected. For the simultaneous game,
a social planner controlling information sharing (security investment) imposes unrea-
sonably high sharing (security investment). Firms free ride in the variable they control.
The social planner imposes more moderate levels in the two period games. A social plan-
ner controlling both information sharing and security investment in a two period game
where the social planner moves ﬁrst is the most beneﬁcial control scenario when the
ﬁrms’ defense eﬃciencies are high. If these are suﬃciently high, the attack is deterred
altogether.Keywords: Cyber war; Conﬂict; Contest success function; Security investment; Information shar-
ing; Security breaches; Interdependence; Social planner; Social welfare; Budget control
1. Introduction
Information sharing and security investment are essential in today’s internet 
era. Firms naturally ﬁnd incentives to invest in security technology, but incen-
tives for information sharing are harder to furnish. Aside from some cases 
where conﬁdentiality plays a role, information sharing is usually collectively 
beneﬁcial. Gordon et al. (2006b) identify three categories of information disclo-
sure. These are voluntary disclosure of proactive steps toward improving infor-
mation security, voluntary disclosure of information security vulnerabilities, 
and voluntary disclosure of information security breaches. Two recent develop-
ments impact information disclosure. First, the US federal government encour-
ages the establishment of Security Based Information Sharing Organizations 
(SB/ISOs) of various kinds, such as Information Sharing & Analysis Centers 
(ISACs), CERT, INFRAGARD, etc. Second, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) places strict requirements on ﬁrms, such as (Sections 302 and 404) estab-
lishing and maintaining adequate internal controls for ﬁnancial reporting, and 
assessing annually the eﬀectiveness of those controls. These are steps in the 
right direction. There is a need to scrutinize the underlying logic by which ﬁrms 
decide whether or not to share information. When cases have been identiﬁed 
where information sharing does, should, or can indeed occur, which this article 
intends to accomplish, then infrastructure, laws, regulations, and cultures may 
be developed and designed to enhance information sharing.
Although SOX does not regulate changes in information security activities, 
Gordon et al. (2006b) ﬁnd that voluntary disclosure in 2003–2004 increased 
100% compared with 2000–2001, concomitant with enhanced awareness of 
the role of information security. Whether this trend will continue in the future 
is unclear since a double edged sword is involved when determining whether to 
disclose information security activities. A ﬁrm wants everyone to perceive that 
its information activities are secure. To build up that perception, outsiders need 
information. Two extreme strategies are as follows. The ﬁrst is for a ﬁrm to 
state that we use the most recent and advanced technology and procedures, 
but you have to trust us since we release no information about these which 
can be exploited by agents with undesirable objectives. The second is for a ﬁrm 
to release all information about technology and procedures so that all agents 
know the exact manner in which the ﬁrm is well protected. The potential down-
side of this second strategy is that agents with undesirable objectives may be 
better suited to design an attack strategy since they know what they are up 
against. We often hear ﬁrms choosing intermediates between these two
extremes by alluding to the presence of the most advanced information security
technology and procedures, without being too speciﬁc about what these are.
Information sharing and security investment have linkages to accounting and 
public policy, as also observed by Gordon et al. (2003). First, accounting means 
representing information in certain formats and on chosen media, for 
subsequent release according to regulations. Second, accountants administer 
internal controls for generating and disseminating information which involves 
tradeoﬀs between availability, retrievability, authentication, eﬃcient dissemi-
nation, security, and conﬁdentiality. See Ghose (2007) for some of these trade-
oﬀs. Third, accountants lay the foundation for assessing strategies about 
gaining competitive advantage, which encompasses assessing the expenditures, 
risks, beneﬁts, and proﬁts of various chosen levels of information sharing and 
security investment. Fourth, since SOX regulates internal controls for ﬁnancial 
reporting, which is under the purview of accounting, information sharing and 
security investment get more intrinsically linked with accounting. The linkage 
to public policy follows since the security of an interlinked information system 
depends on the strategies about information sharing and security investment 
chosen by all actors, those that generate and maintain it, those that are players 
in it, those that run it or attempt to administer or regulate it, those that are 
aﬀected by it and attempt to aﬀect it in return, those that attempt to use it 
to their advantage, those that attempt to reshape it, and those that attempt 
to shut it down.
Information sharing is a recent occurrence in the cyber era, but has a certain
history in the literature on oligopolies, cooperative relationships, joint ven-
tures, and trade associations (Gal-Or, 1985; Kirby, 1988; Novshek and Son-
nenschein, 1982; Shapiro, 1986; Vives, 1990; Ziv, 1993). In the cyber era
information sharing has been analyzed by Gal-Or and Ghose (2003, 2005),
Gordon et al. (2003) and Schechter and Smith (2003). Security breaches and
vulnerabilities have been analyzed by Campbell et al. (2003), Cavusoglu
et al. (2004), Gordon and Loeb (2001, 2002, 2003), Gordon et al. (2006a),
Hausken (2006b), Schenk and Schenk (2002), Tanaka et al. (2005).
The literature on information sharing and information security typically con-
siders the external threat as ﬁxed and immutable. In contrast, this article consid-
ers an external agent which optimizes a costly attack just as the two ﬁrms subject
to attack optimize a costly defense. Two ﬁrms may operate independently in dif-
ferent markets, they may share markets, they may be strong competitors, they
may be interlinked through vertical integration upstream or downstream, out-
sourcing, or other cooperative arrangements, or they may be so strongly inter-
connected that an attack on one is tantamount, in varying degrees, to an attack
on the other. The interdependence may also be negative. For example, one
ﬁrm’s increase in security investment can redirect the agent’s attack to the other
ﬁrm and therefore reduce the other ﬁrm’s contest success. The various kinds of
interaction between ﬁrms inﬂuence the cyber war and strategic choices of both
ﬁrms and the external agent. Both the interdependence between ﬁrms and the
capacity of the external agent to inﬂict cyber attacks, determined by the agent’s
attack eﬃciency, are essential when scrutinizing incentives for information shar-
ing. This article assigns separate modeling features for information sharing and
security investment. A contest success function models information sharing
with relative eﬀectiveness to security investment. By considering the informa-
tion sharing between ﬁrms, the leakage cost function is also modeled diﬀerently
from the security investment cost function.
The two ﬁrms and attacking agent maximize their proﬁts individually. The
article proceeds to assume an exogenously given level of information sharing.
This makes an interesting case to model the operation of the information shar-
ing organizations (e.g., US-CERT), which is the ﬁrms’ most commonly used
channel for sharing their security information. The article thereafter assumes
an exogenously given level of security investment. A predetermined level of
security investment provides another interesting case about the problems of
limiting information security budgets within ﬁrms. A social planner is intro-
duced under a variety of diﬀerent control scenarios. Given the current emer-
gence of SB/ISOs, combined with ﬁrms’ ubiquitous needs to control budgets,
this article intends to understand the quite diﬀerent impacts when a social plan-
ner or budget controls information sharing only, security investment only, or
both, in a simultaneous game, and two period game.
One main diﬀerence between security investments and information sharing is
that the former requires costly funding, planning, sustained eﬀort through time,
involving buildup of infrastructure, culture, and competence, while the latter
may be more or less costless aside from leakage costs as a consequence of shar-
ing. If information about security breaches, and other kinds of information, are
compiled and stored in an organized and secure manner within each ﬁrm, decid-
ing to share it with another ﬁrm may not involve more than pushing a transfer
button, or storing the information on a disk and delivering it. In other words,
security investments are costly since all investments are costly, while informa-
tion sharing is costly in the diﬀerent sense of risk of information leakage.
Gordon et al. (2003) ﬁnd that when ﬁrms share information, each ﬁrm has 
reduced incentives to invest in information security. In contrast, Gal-Or and 
Ghose (2005) ﬁnd that ‘‘security technology investments and security informa-
tion sharing act as ‘strategic complements’’’. This article assumes substitutabil-
ity between own security investment and information received by the other ﬁrm, 
but allows for complementarity when the interdependence is negative.
The work by Gordon et al. (2003) and Gal-Or and Ghose (2005), and also 
this article, assume information scaled along one dimension. Gordon et al.
(2003, p. 469) refer to a portion, which is a number between zero and one, of a 
ﬁrm’s computer security information that it may decide to share with the other 
ﬁrm. Similarly, Gal-Or and Ghose (2005, p. 189) ‘‘normalize the amount of 
security information being shared so that it always lies between 0 and 1’’. 
Generally, information is multi-faceted, of diﬀerent kinds, and with diﬀerent 
degrees of importance for diﬀerent purposes. A one-dimensional con-ception of 
information means that diﬀerent kinds of information are given dif-ferent 
weights according to their relative importance.
ISACs were developed by industry professionals after Presidential Decision
Directive 63 was issued in 1998. PDD 63 was designed to create a public and
private sector partnership to protect the critical infrastructure of the United
States. PDD 63 was replaced in 2003 with HSPD-7. One example is the Finan-
cial Services Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center—FS/ISAC The
FS/ISAC became operational in October 1999 and was restructured in 2003 to
broaden its mission and serve all ﬁnancial services sector participants. The
membership and participants are made up of eligible members (more than
1500) of the Financial Services Sector: Banks, S& L, Credit Unions, Securities
Firms, Insurance Companies, Credit Card Companies, Mortgage Banking
Companies, Financial Services sector proﬁts, Financial Services Service
Bureaus, Appropriate Industry Associations. The FS/ISAC gathers threat,
risks, and vulnerability information about cyber and physical risks faced by
the ﬁnancial services sector. Members have a platform for sharing information
and working with professionals who face the same problems. The FS/ISAC has
industry experts to analyze risks and deliver alerts to participants. Alerts may
be Normal, Urgent, or Crisis. They identify the level of risk to the sector, pro-
vide detail on the alert, and provide any recommended solution to the risk.1
There are four diﬀerences between this article and Hausken’s (2006a) anal-
ysis of the interdependence, income, and substitution eﬀects. First, and most 
importantly, this article assumes that each ﬁrm has two strategic choice vari-
ables, information sharing and security investment, while Hausken (2006a) 
assumes one strategic choice variable, security investment. This allows analyz-
ing sophisticated tradeoﬀs between information sharing and security invest-
ment, in interaction with an optimizing external agent. Second, Hausken 
(2006a) lets the agent’s attack depend on a resource constraint and an attack 
eﬃciency. For the substitution eﬀect, the agent optimizes the attacks across the 
two ﬁrms subject to the resource constraint. In contrast, this article lets the 
agent choose optimal attacks against both ﬁrms, with no resource con-straint, 
and dependent on an attack eﬃciency. This implicitly accounts for opti-mal 
substitution across the two ﬁrms.2 Third, Hausken (2006a) considers the1 I am indebted to William Lucyshyn for the formulation about ISACs in this paragraph.
2 A ﬁrm that decides to share information with another ﬁrm risks information leakage, and
additionally causes a beneﬁt for the other ﬁrm. This makes the ﬁrst ﬁrm a more vulnerable target,
and the external agent can be expected to substitute its attack from the other ﬁrm towards the ﬁrst
ﬁrm. Hence the substitution eﬀect is not conducive to information sharing. The substitution eﬀect is
particularly interesting related to how two ﬁrms are diﬀerent, and how the agent substitutes back
and forth between the ﬁrms dependent on such diﬀerences.
income eﬀect for n equivalent ﬁrms assuming an income reduction parameter 
which eliminates the attack (e.g. through freezing the agent’s assets) if the 
ﬁrms’ security investments are suﬃciently large. This article conﬁnes attention 
to two ﬁrms and does not consider the income eﬀect in this sense. However, the 
income eﬀect is considered in the sense of depending on the agent’s attack eﬃ-
ciency which is a parameter in the model. If the attack eﬃciency is reduced to 
zero, the agent’s attack becomes inﬁnitely costly, which eﬀectively eliminates 
the agent’s income. Fourth, this article considers the social planner’s point 
of view which is especially important when assessing information sharing. Both 
Hausken (2006a) and this article consider interdependence between ﬁrms, which 
may be positive, zero, or negative.
Section 3 analyzes the model when each ﬁrm and the agent optimize individ-
ually. Section 4 assumes exogenously given information sharing. Section 5
assumes exogenously given security investment. Section 6 introduces a social
planner who controls information sharing. Section 6.1 analyzes the two period
game where the social planner moves ﬁrst, while the ﬁrms and agent choose
security investments and attacks in the second period. Section 6.2 considers
the simultaneous game. Section 7 considers a social planner that controls secu-
rity investment in a simultaneous game. Section 8 analyzes a social planner that
controls both information sharing and security investment. Section 8.1 consid-
ers the simultaneous game. Section 8.2 considers the two period game where
the social planner moves ﬁrst. Section 9 assesses which games and control sce-
narios the agent and social planner prefer. Section 10 concludes.2. The model
Consider two ﬁrms i and j with assets they value as ri and rj. An external
agent launches a cyber security attack of magnitude Ti against ﬁrm i and Tj
against ﬁrm j to appropriate as much as possible of the assets.3 The cyber
attack expenditure is Fi, where oFi/oTi > 0. We consider the simple case
Fi = CTi, where 1/C is the eﬃciency of cyber attack, and C is the ineﬃciency.
This means that C is a unit transformation cost. The attack means attempting
to break through the security defense of the ﬁrms in order to appropriate, get
access to, or conﬁscate, something of value (e.g. bank accounts), or secure
information which can be used to the ﬁrm’s disadvantage, or to other ﬁrms’
advantage, or to blackmail the ﬁrm, or to generate value in some other covert
or not so covert manner.3 The author has analyzed the model when asset ri is valued as ri by ﬁrm i and Ri by the external
agent, and analogously for rj. The solution is more space consuming to write out, the results are
intuitive, and the logic, results and policy recommendations are best conveyed conﬁning attention
to ri and rj.
Firm i invests ti in information security technology to defend its asset, where
ti is the security investment cost, which we refer to as the investment. Firm i’s
investment consists in employing security experts, installing ﬁrewalls, encryp-
tion techniques, access control mechanisms, intrusion detection systems, etc.
The security investment expenditure is fi, where ofi/oti > 0. We consider the
simple case fi = citi, where 1/ci is the eﬃciency of security investment for ﬁrm
i, so that ci is the ineﬃciency, or a unit transformation cost. For simplicity,
we assume risk neutral agents which does not change the nature of the argu-
ment. Both the expenditures citi and CTi can be capital and/or labor.
Firms are usually related to each other, e.g. through competitive relation-
ships, or upstream and downstream networks. The relationship may consist
in interconnection in goods and services (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003), or com-
munication and information exchange via Electronic Data Interchanges (EDI).
We introduce the parameter a to describe the two ﬁrms’ relationship in resist-
ing cyber attacks. The cyber contest between a ﬁrm and the agent for an asset
takes the common ratio form (Skaperdas, 1996). Assuming relationship a
between the ﬁrms, and no information sharing, we consider the four contest
success functions
hi ¼ ti þ atj
ti þ T i þ aðtj þ T jÞ ; h
j ¼ tj þ ati
tj þ T j þ aðti þ T iÞ
Hi ¼ 1 hi ¼ T i þ aT j
ti þ T i þ aðtj þ T jÞ ; H
j ¼ 1 hj ¼ T j þ aT i
tj þ T j þ aðti þ T iÞ
ð1Þ
We require all numerators to be positive. hi and hj are the contest success of
ﬁrms i and j. Hi and Hj are the contest success of the agent against ﬁrms i
and j. Each ﬁrm beneﬁts concavely from its own security investment, and suf-
fers convexly from the agent’s attack against itself. With positive interdepen-
dence, each ﬁrm beneﬁts concavely from the other ﬁrm’s security investment,
and suﬀers convexly from the agent’s attack against the other ﬁrm. With neg-
ative interdependence, each ﬁrm suﬀers concavely from the other ﬁrm’s secu-
rity investment, and beneﬁts convexly from the agent’s attack against the
other ﬁrm. That is, for ﬁrm i, ohi=oti P 0; o2hi=ot2i 6 0; ohi=otj P 0 when
a > 0,ohi/otj 6 0 when a< 0;o2hi=ot2j 6 0;ohi=oT i6 0;o
2hi=oT 2i P 0;oh
i=oT j6 0
when a > 0,ohi/oTjP 0 when a < 0; o
2hi=oT 2j P 0. The expressions for the
other three contest success functions are analogous.
When a is positive, the ﬁrms cooperate in defending themselves. Positive 
interdependence between ﬁrms also means that the agent’s attack against one 
ﬁrm gets channeled further to a degree a to the other ﬁrm, exempliﬁed with 
baggage transferred from one airline to the other (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003). 
Hence with positive interdependence, each ﬁrm gets a stronger defense, due to 
cooperation with the other ﬁrm, but is also subject to a stronger attack, due to
channeling of the attack through the other ﬁrm. When a = 1, the ﬁrms are 100% 
interdependent in the sense that ﬁrm i’s choice of ti has equal defense impact for 
ﬁrm i and ﬁrm j, and analogously for tj. a > 1 is theoretically pos-sible, but 
unlikely in praxis, and we exclude the possibility. It means that ﬁrm i’s security 
investment ti has larger defense impact for ﬁrm j than for ﬁrm i. When a = 0, the 
ﬁrms are 100% independent and operate in isolation from each other. One ﬁrm’s 
security investment then exclusively defends itself, with neither positive nor 
negative impact on the other ﬁrm.
When a is negative, which we refer to as negative interdependence, each
ﬁrm’s security investment is detrimental to the other ﬁrm, and merely strength-
ens one’s own ﬁrm. Conversely to positive a, this also means that an attack on
the other ﬁrm is beneﬁcial for one’s own ﬁrm. Hence with negative a, each ﬁrm
gets a weaker defense, and is subject to a weaker attack. Although a can be
arbitrarily negative, we do not allow negative contest success. Hence all numer-
ators in (1) must be positive. For the special case that ti = tj = Ti = Tj, all the
four contest success functions in (1) equal 1/2, independently of a. Fig. 1 illus-
trates the four contest success functions when ﬁrm i invests twice as much as
ﬁrm i, and as the external agent invests against each of the ﬁrms, ti = 2 and
tj = Ti = Tj = 1. When a = 1, both ﬁrms cooperatively enjoy ﬁrm i’s high
investment, and their contest success is 0.6, while the agent earns 0.4 from each
of the contests. As a decreases to a = 0, the ﬁrms operate independently. This
means that ﬁrm i and the agent earn contest success 2/3 and 1/3 respectively in
their contest, while ﬁrm j and the agent both earn contest success 1/2 since their
investments are equal. As a becomes negative, ﬁrm j starts to suﬀer, and the
agent starts to suﬀer in the contest with ﬁrm i. Eq. (1) gives hj = 0 when
a =  0.5, which means that the agent earns maximum contest success. Also,
a =  0.5 gives hi = 3/4 and Hi = 1/4, to the beneﬁt of ﬁrm i. Negative a causesFig. 1. Contest success as functions of the interdependence a when ti = 2, tj = Ti = Tj = 1, cf.
Section 2.
a beneﬁt for the ﬁrm that invests most, and larger discrepancies in the contest
success. The interdependence a is a system characteristics and we assume the
same a for both contests.
Negative interdependence is more likely in competitive and conﬂictful envi-
ronments where ﬁrms do not jointly beneﬁt from their security investments, but
beneﬁt from investing more in security than the other ﬁrm. The higher investor
may perceive the external agent as more threatening and may no longer accept
the free ride of the lower investor, but instead prefer the agent to attack the
other ﬁrm instead of one’s own ﬁrm. Let us consider an example to illustrate
negative interdependence, and assume ti > tj = Ti = Tj since equal investments
give contest success 1/2 independently of a. Assume that ﬁrm i spends part of
its budget on attracting the other ﬁrm’s Security Oﬃcer. We conceptualize this
so that a decreases. The impact in (1) is that tj + ati decreases so that the con-
test success of ﬁrm j decreases, and the agent succeeds more against ﬁrm j. Also
ti + atj in (1) decreases, but since ti > tj, the contest success of ﬁrm i increases as
a decreases, and the agent succeeds less against ﬁrm i. The Security Oﬃcer of
ﬁrm j brings more defending experience to ﬁrm i. This, combined with ﬁrm i’s
superior investment, cause higher contest success for ﬁrm i and for the agent
against ﬁrm j, and conversely lower contest success for ﬁrm j and for the agent
against ﬁrm i. There are also other cases where ﬁrms’ security investments are
detrimental to other ﬁrms, which causes negative a. If security investments are
not conﬁdential but publicly available, ﬁrms with low investments can experi-
ence high investments by other ﬁrms as detrimental to customer conﬁdence.
Further, security investments can be of defensive or oﬀensive nature in various
manners. For example, the defense of one ﬁrm may deter the agent from
attacks on all ﬁrms, e.g. when the defense convinces the agent that other ﬁrms
have similar defenses and that attack would be futile. Alternatively, the defense
of one ﬁrm may implicitly redirect the agent to other ﬁrms, in extreme cases by
suggesting that other ﬁrms are more easy targets. The proﬁts vi, vj, and V of
ﬁrm i, ﬁrm j, and the agent, respectively, are
vi ¼ ti þ atjti þ T i þ aðtj þ T jÞ ri  citi; vj ¼
tj þ ati
tj þ T j þ aðti þ T iÞ rj  cjtj
V ¼ T i þ aT j
ti þ T i þ aðtj þ T jÞ ri þ
T j þ aT i
tj þ T j þ aðti þ T iÞ rj  CT i  CT j
ð2Þ
Firm i invests ti in security technology at an expenditure citi. The investments
ti + atj are contested by the agent’s attack Ti + aTj. Firm i retains the fraction
hi of its asset ri, and the agent appropriates the remaining fraction 1-h
i. Firm j
retains the analogous fraction hj through an expenditure cjtj. The agent thus
gets two fractions and incurs expenditures C(Ti + Tj).
Assume that ﬁrm i shares an amount si of information with ﬁrm j, which
means that ﬁrm i delivers si to ﬁrm j, and that ﬁrm j shares an amount sj of
information with ﬁrm i. Gordon et al. (2003) ﬁnd that when ﬁrms share infor-
mation, each ﬁrm has reduced incentives to invest in information security. This
means that an increase in sj causes a decrease in ti. Both sj and ti strengthen ﬁrm
i’s defense. These two kinds of defense act as strategic substitutes. We thus con-
sider the more general contest success function
ki ¼ ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ ð3Þ
which satisﬁes the same conditions as hi. A ﬁrm beneﬁts concavely from
information sharing from the other ﬁrm, regardless of their relationship,
oki=osj P 0; o
2ki=os2j 6 0.With positive interdependence, each ﬁrm also beneﬁts
concavely from its own information sharing, dependent on the size of
a; oki=osi P 0; o2ki=os2i 6 0. When a > 0, ti, si, tj, sj are substitutable weapons
to defend the ﬁrms from cyber attacks.With negative interdependence, each ﬁrm
suﬀers concavely from its own information sharing, oki=osi 6 0; o2ki=osi2 6 0. 
When a < 0 ,ti and sj remain substitutes, while ti and tj, and ti and si, are comple-
ments in the sense that an increase in one is compensated with an increase of the 
other. With negative interdependence, if a ﬁrm increases its information sharing, 
or the other ﬁrm increases its security investment, the ﬁrm must increase its secu-
rity investment to maintain its contest success. Strategic complementarity is also 
found by Gal-Or and Ghose (2005, p. 193) where ﬁrms also choose prices. The 
demand facing each product is linear in self and cross-price eﬀects. They ﬁnd that 
increased security investment by one ﬁrm leads to increased security investment 
and increased information sharing by its competitor. Comparing with Gordon 
et al. (2003), Gal-Or and Ghose (2005, p. 194) observe that ‘‘the main reason for 
the diﬀerent result is the existence of the demand enhancing eﬀects of infor-
mation security sharing and technology investments in our model’’. Summing 
up, Eq. (3) accounts for substitutability between sj and ti under all circumstances, 
accounts for more extensive substitutability with positive interdependence, and 
also accounts for complementarity with negative interdependence.
Each ﬁrm succeeds better in the contest with the agent when it receives infor-
mation from the other ﬁrm. The parameter c scales how eﬀective is information
from the other ﬁrm relative to own security investment when it comes to con-
testing the agent’s attack. With no interdependence, a = 0, the numerator in (3)
becomes ti + csj which is ﬁrm i’s competitive eﬀort. With positive interdepen-
dence, the term acsi in the numerator in (3) does not mean that ﬁrm i receives
its same information si in return from ﬁrm j, but that si strengthens ﬁrm j’s
competitive eﬀort tj + csi which gets channeled back to ﬁrm i moderated by
a. With negative interdependence, csi strengthens ﬁrm j’s competitive eﬀort
tj + csi, which has negative impact on ﬁrm i just as tj has negative impact when
a < 0.
Exchanging information is risky for both ﬁrms. Firms are usually open
rather than closed systems, and transmission channels may be unreliable.
When two ﬁrms share information, some actors within or associated with the 
two ﬁrms may more easily ﬁnd an incentive to transfer the information further 
onto criminal agents, or to agents with a conﬂict of interest with one or both 
ﬁrms, since it is more diﬃcult to identify the perpetrator spreading the informa-
tion, than when two ﬁrms do not share information. Also, the transfer channels 
and broader domain within which the information exists give hackers larger 
room for maneuver. Spreading information thus increases the risk of leakage. 
Gal-Or and Ghose (2005, pp. 190–191) designate leakage costs ‘‘that might be 
inﬂicted on ﬁrm i as a result of such sharing’’. They suggest the functional form
gi ¼ /1s2i  /2s2j  /3sisj, where /1P /2 + /3. We deﬁne /1 as the ineﬃciency
(unit cost) of own leakage, /2 as the eﬃciency (unit beneﬁt) of the other ﬁrm j’s
leakage (since ﬁrm i beneﬁts from it), and /3 as the eﬃciency (unit beneﬁt) of
joint leakage. First, ogi/osi > 0 and og
i/osj < 0 since it is risky to share informa-
tion and beneﬁcial to receive it. Second, o2gi=os2i > 0 and o
2gi=os2j < 0 due to
‘‘possible deleterious ripple eﬀects’’ of security breaches. Third, o2gi/osiosj 6 0
since ‘‘intensiﬁed sharing by the competitor reduces the marginal leakage costs
incurred by the ﬁrm’’. The proﬁts ui, uj, and U of ﬁrm i, ﬁrm j, and the agent,
respectively, are
ui ¼ ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ ri  citi  ð/1s
2
i  /2s2j  /3sisjÞ
uj ¼ tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞtj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ rj  cjtj  ð/1s
2
j  /2s2i  /3sisjÞ
U ¼ T i þ aT j
ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ ri þ
T j þ aT i
tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ rj
 CðT i þ T jÞ
ð4Þ
That ﬁrms in a competitive relationship are less likely to engage in information
sharing is modeled in (4) in the following ways. The ﬁrst is to increase /1. The
negative impact of information leakage from one ﬁrm can get magniﬁed
through negative advertisement by the other ﬁrm which is more likely with a
competitive relationship. The second is to decrease /2. This means that a leak-
age from the other ﬁrm is less useful for one’s own ﬁrm. The third is to decrease
/3 which reduces the eﬃciency of joint leakage. The parameters c and a also
reﬂect competitiveness between ﬁrms, but more indirectly since these parame-
ters have other purposes. When c decreases, the ﬁrms share less information
since it becomes less useful relative to security investment. When a decreases
and becomes negative, sharing information is directly harmful to one’s own
proﬁt.
Each ﬁrm’s vulnerability is modeled in (4) in two ways, aside from the ﬁrm
being vulnerable as determined by the information sharing parameters c, /1,
/2, /3. A ﬁrm’s vulnerability is important when determining cumulative eﬀorts
in enhancing information security. First, a vulnerable ﬁrm has a higher unit
cost c of security investment. If ﬁrm i is more vulnerable, it can thus aﬀord a
lower security investment, which causes lower contest success. Second, ﬁrm
i’s asset ri can be reinterpreted as bri, 0 6 b 6 1, where b is a usability param-
eter. As b decreases below 1, the vulnerable ﬁrm possesses a smaller asset. The
ﬁrm assumes that a part of its asset is already lost through its vulnerability, and
does its best to defend the remaining part of its asset.
We hereafter refer to the ﬁrms’ aggregate defense and attack as
tAi ¼ ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ; tAj ¼ tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
T Ai ¼ T i þ aT j; T Aj ¼ T j þ aT i ð5Þ
The model has 10 parameters. These are four ﬁrm characteristics ri, rj, ci, cj,
four information sharing parameters c, /1, /2, /3, one agent characteristic
C, and the interdependence a. These 10 parameters are common knowledge
for all actors.3. Analyzing the model: each ﬁrm and the agent optimize individually
Firm i’s free choice variables are ti and si, ﬁrm j’s free choice variables are tj 
and sj, and the external agent’s free choice variables are Ti and Tj. The two 
ﬁrms and one agent choose their free choice variables simultaneously and inde-
pendently to maximize proﬁts. Appendix 1 determines the six FOCs (ﬁrst order 
conditions), the six choice variables, and the three proﬁts. Information sharing 
in (A.6) is
si ¼ acð2/1ci þ /3cjÞð2/1  /3Þð2/1 þ /3Þ
ð6Þ
Proposition 1. Information sharing increases linearly in the interdependence, is
zero with negative or no interdependence, and increases linearly more in one’s own
than in the other firm’s unit cost of security investment. That is, osi/oa > 0 when
a > 0, si = 0 when a60;osi=oci>0;osi=ocj>0;o2si=oa2¼o2si=oc2i ¼o2si=oc2j ¼0.
Proof. Follows from (6). 2/1 > /3 since /1P /2 + /3. h
That information sharing increases in the interdependence between ﬁrms is
exempliﬁed by the US telecommunications industry which is highly interdepen-
dent and experiences substantial information sharing.4 The high degree of com-
petitiveness has been seen suggested as a tentative explanation of the need to4 I thank William Lucyshyn for making this observation about the US telecommunications
industry.
share information, but interdependence seems to be a more plausible explana-
tion. Firms realize that through their strong interdependence, sharing informa-
tion with other ﬁrms ﬂows back as a beneﬁt to themselves. Allowing shared
information to ﬂow more freely throughout the industry gives each ﬁrm a com-
petitive advantage, and gives the ﬁrms a more robust defense against external
attackers. As the interdependence decreases to zero, information sharing van-
ishes, and remains absent for negative interdependence. When ﬁrms exist in
isolation from each other, no ﬁrm has an incentive to share information, but
would prefer to receive information. The classical free rider dilemma explains
why information sharing does not occur, as also found by Gordon et al. (2003).
The need to free ride becomes in principle even stronger for negative interde-
pendence, since sharing information then gives a competitive advantage to
the other ﬁrm which has direct negative impact on one’s own defense. Since
a negative amount of information cannot be shared, each ﬁrm refrains from
information sharing in this case.
As the unit cost of security investment increases, a ﬁrm shifts its emphasis
toward more information sharing to maintain its defense. With equal unit costs
ci = cj for the two ﬁrms, ci is placed outside the bracket in the numerator in (6).
The bracket is abbreviated with the corresponding bracket in the denominator,
and the remaining numerator is acci. The unit cost of security investment, the
interdependence, and the eﬀectiveness of information sharing relative to secu-
rity investment then have equally strong and multiplicative proportional
impact on boosting information sharing.
Information sharing of both ﬁrms increases regardless whose unit cost
increases. But, as one ﬁrm’s unit cost of security investment increases more
than that of the other ﬁrm, the ﬁrst ﬁrm shares substantially more information,
and the other ﬁrm shares moderately more information. The ﬁrm with the
highest unit cost is least inclined to free ride in information sharing. First,
the higher unit cost implies a need to shift from security investment to informa-
tion sharing. Second, the higher unit cost also causes the other ﬁrm to share
information, which beneﬁts the ﬁrst ﬁrm. As an example, assume that the inef-
ﬁciency of own information leakage is /1 = 2, while the eﬃciency of joint leak-
age is /3 = 1. This is a moderate example since /1 can be substantially larger
than /3. With benchmark equal unit costs ci = cj = 1, the bracket in the numer-
ator in (6) equals 5. Increasing own unit cost to ci = 2, the bracket becomes 9.
Alternatively, increasing the other ﬁrm’s unit cost to cj = 2, the bracket merely
increases to 6. The increase in information sharing is 80% in the ﬁrst case and
only 20% in the second case.5
The aggregate attack and defense determined by (5), (A.3), (A.6), (A.7) and 
(A.8) are inverse U shaped in each other, i.e.5 Intuitively, si in (6) increases in c and /3, and decreases in /1.
T Ai ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tAi ð1þ aÞri
C
r
 tAi ; T Ai ¼
cirið1þ aÞ2
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
tAi ¼
Crið1þ aÞ
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
;
tAi
T Ai
¼ C
cið1þ aÞ
ð7Þ
Proposition 2. Information sharing and aggregate attack are interlinked through
the interdependence and the firm’s unit cost of security investment. Both increase
in the interdependence, osi/oa > 0 when a > 0, and oT Ai =oa > 0. Information
sharing increases in the unit cost, osi/oci > 0. The aggregate attack increases
(decreases) in the firm’s unit cost when it is low (high). That is, oT Ai =oci > 0 when
ci < C/(1 + a), and oT Ai =oci < 0 otherwise.Proof. Follows from (6), (7) and Appendix 1. h
As the interdependence between ﬁrms increases, the agent realizes that an
attack launched against one ﬁrm gets propelled further to the other ﬁrm. Hence
the aggregate attack increases in the interdependence. Each ﬁrm responds by
increasing its information sharing. Hence both aggregate attack and informa-
tion sharing increase in the interdependence between ﬁrms. The results aremixed
for the aggregate defense which consists of both security investment and infor-
mation sharing. The aggregate defense increases in the interdependence when
the unit cost of security investment is low, otAi =oa > 0 when ci < C/(1 + a),
and decreases when it is high, otAi =oa < 0 when ci > C/(1 + a), (see (A.13)).
When the unit cost is low, each ﬁrm can aﬀord a large security investment, which
takes care of a major part of the aggregate defense as the interdependence
increases. Hence when ci is low, aggregate attack, information sharing, and
aggregate defense increase in a. When the unit cost is high, each ﬁrm cannot
aﬀord a large security investment. Instead it has to rely on information sharing
taking care of part of the defense. Hence when ci is high, aggregate attack and
information sharing increase in a, while aggregate defense decreases in a.
As the ﬁrm’s unit cost of security investment increases, its aggregate defense
gets shifted from security investment to information sharing. The aggregate
defense decreases, otAi =oci < 0, and information sharing increases, osi/oci > 0.
The agent responds to this in a mixed manner. When ci is low, the aggregate
defense is overwhelming, and the agent launches a small attack which increases
in ci and reaches a maximum. As ci increases further, the aggregate defense
weakens, and the agent can cash in on its attack by reducing it. Hence when
ci is low, aggregate attack and information sharing increase in ci. When ci is
high, information sharing increases in ci, while aggregate attack decreases in
ci. Aggregate defense always decrease in ci, and aggregate attack decrease in C.
Assume that ci < C/(1 + a), which is a weak position for the agent. This
means that the agent’s unit cost of attack is high, the ﬁrm’s unit cost is low,
and the interdependence is low. In this case the agent’s aggregate attack
increases in the ﬁrm’s unit cost. Although burdened with a high C, the agent
earns a competitive advantage from a larger attack as the ﬁrm gets burdened
with a higher ci which causes a lower aggregate defense, otAi =oci < 0. When
ci > C/(1 + a), the results are opposite. The stronger agent’s position causes
it to cash in on its attack as ci increases.
Proposition 3. The aggregate attack is inverse U shaped in the aggregate defense
and equals zero when tAi > rið1þ aÞ=C. Information sharing is independent of the
agent’s unit cost C, and also independent of ri, rj, /2. The aggregate attack and
defense depend on the same parameters, and are independent of the information
sharing parameters c, /1, /2, /3, and also independent of the other firm’s
characteristics rj, cj. The aggregate defense increases (decreases) in the agent’s
unit cost when it is low (high). That is, otAi =oC > 0 when ci > C/(1 + a), and
otAi =oC < 0 otherwise.
Proof. Follows from (6), (7) and (A.14). h
When the defense is weak, the agent is successful even with a modest attack.
As the defense increases, so does the attack toward a maximum, and it there-
after decreases. When the defense is suﬃciently strong, the agent gives up and
refrains from attacking. To understand the considerable independence between
information sharing and attack with six free choice variables, ﬁrst consider the
ﬁrm’s perspective. If C or ri changes, both the aggregate attack and defense
change. In this case the ﬁrm changes its aggregate defense by changing its secu-
rity investment ti, while keeping its information sharing si unchanged. The
ﬁrm’s security investment in (A.7) depends on all the 10 parameters except
/2 which plays a role in the ﬁrm proﬁts. Consequently the aggregate attack
does not depend on c, /1, /2, /3. In other words, the ﬁrm’s security investment
is driven by a broad set of concerns encompassing all parameters (except /2),
while the ﬁrm’s information sharing is driven by a narrower set of concerns
encompassing information sharing parameters, but not encompassing the
agent’s unit cost, the two ﬁrms’ values, and /2. Security investment and infor-
mation sharing by both ﬁrms generate aggregate defense for each ﬁrm which
encompasses all the parameters except the information sharing parameters
and the other ﬁrm characteristics rj, cj.
For the symmetric case ri = rj = r, ci = cj = c, ti = tj = t, si = sj = s,
ui = uj = u, this gives
t ¼ Cr½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 
cac2
2/1  /3
P 0; s ¼ cac
2/1  /3
T ¼ crð1þ aÞ½C þ cð1þ aÞ2
 tAi ¼
Crð1þ aÞ
½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 ; T
A
i ¼
crð1þ aÞ2
½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 ;
tAi
T Ai
¼ C
cð1þ aÞ
u ¼ C½C þ cð1þ aÞ r  ct  ð/1  /2  /3Þs
2
u ¼ CrðC þ caÞ½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 þ
c2ac2½ð2 aÞ/1 þ a/2  ð1 aÞ/3
ð2/1  /3Þ2
U ¼ 2c
2rð1þ aÞ2
½C þ cð1þ aÞ2
ð8Þ
Information sharing increases, and security investment decreases, in the inter-
dependence. The ﬁrms’ proﬁt increases in the interdependence when the unit 
cost c is large, see (A.15), in which case information sharing is beneﬁcial. The 
agent’s proﬁt increases in the interdependence, see (A.16), since both ﬁrms 
then can be attacked more thoroughly. Information sharing is independent of 
the agent’s unit cost of attack C. Both the aggregate defense and the security 
investment are inverse U shaped in the agent’s unit cost of attack, with 
maximum when C = c(1 + a), and equals zero when C is too low or too high 
as determined by t = 0  i n (8). When the attack is too low, there is no need for
the ﬁrms to be much concerned and they can get away with low security 
investment. Conversely, when the attack is too large, the ﬁrms get over-
whelmed, their defense doesn’t matter much, and security investment gets 
reduced, eventually to zero. The security investment and aggregate defense are 
maximum when the attack is large enough to pose a threat, while at the same 
time the ﬁrms can limit that threat by designing a suﬃcient defense. As C de-
creases, the attack gets more and more overwhelming, and security invest-
ment decreases to zero. Section 5 analyzes the case with exogenously given 
security investment, which causes information sharing to depend on C. For 
very low C, even information sharing is not worth while against a formidable 
attacker.
Policy advice 1. Each firm shifts some of its emphasis from security investment to
information sharing as the interdependence, unit cost of security investment,
effectiveness of information sharing, or efficiency of joint leakage increase, or the
inefficiency of own leakage decreases. The agent’s unit cost of attack affects the
security investment and aggregate defense in an inverse U shaped manner, but
does not affect information sharing except when security investment is
exogenously given or zero.
As we develop this article, we exemplify the symmetric solution for the 
parameter values a = c = C = 0.5, c = /2 = 1 ,  r = /1 = 2 ,  /3 = 0. Line 2 
in Table 1 shows the equilibrium solution. Observe the very low information 
sharing s = 0.0625 due to free riding.
Table 1
Security investment, information sharing, attack, social welfare, and attacker proﬁt in symmetric
game where a = c = C = 0.5, c = /2 = 1, r = /1 = 2, /3 = 0
Section Optimization t s T w U
3 Individual ﬁrm and agent optimization 0.5775 0.0625 0.96 1.015 1.44
5 Exogenously given security investment 0.9 0.044 0.999 1.039 1.058
6.1 Social planner controls information
sharing: Two period game
0.39 0.25 0.96 1.085 1.44
6.2 Social planner controls information
sharing: Simultaneous game
0.265 0.375 0.96 1.054 1.44
7 Social planner controls security
investment: Simultaneous game
0.9583 0.042 1 1.038 1
8.1 and 8.2 Social planner controls both information
sharing and security investment
0.75 0.25 1 1.125 14. Exogenously given information sharing
Gordon et al. (2003, p. 478) show that if ﬁrms are allowed to select their lev-
els of information sharing, they will have incentives not to share any security 
information in Nash equilibrium. Eq. (6) shows that this also holds for the cur-
rent model if the interdependence between ﬁrms is zero or negative (a 6 0), if
the unit costs of security investment are zero (ci = cj = 0, rendering information
sharing useless since security investment comes for free), or if the unit cost of
own leakage is inﬁnite (/1 =1). In some cases information sharing may not be
possible or obtainable. The ﬁrms may lack the logistics for compiling or trans-
ferring information. Alternatively, hostility between the ﬁrms may be such that
information is not shared even when such sharing is rational for each ﬁrm.
Other hurdles against information sharing are pressures from owners, share-
holders, employees, or customers, of each ﬁrm, or ﬁrms with which each ﬁrm
has contracts.
It is of interest to determine the impact of specifying information sharing 
exogenously. Assume that the two ﬁrms agree to given levels si and sj of infor-
mation sharing. This may occur through trust building between the two ﬁrms, 
or backed by or facilitated by SB/ISOs. The agent’s FOCs are given by (A.2), 
and the ﬁrms’ FOCs are the ﬁrst two equations in (A.1), where si and sj are now 
constants. Hence the ﬁrst two equations in (A.5) are valid. Inserting these into 
(A.3) and (A.4) and applying (5) gives
tAi ¼
Crið1þ aÞ
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
; T Ai ¼
cirið1þ aÞ2
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
tAj ¼
Crjð1þ aÞ
½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
; T Aj ¼
cjrjð1þ aÞ2
½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
ð9Þ
as in (7), written in terms of aggregate defense and attack. Solving (5) and (9)
gives
ti ¼ C
1 a
ri
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
 arj½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
!
 csj
tj ¼ C
1 a
rj
½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
 ari½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
!
 csi ð10Þ
T i ¼ ð1þ aÞð1 aÞ
ciri
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
 acjrj½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
!
T j ¼ ð1þ aÞð1 aÞ
cjrj
½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
 aciri½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
!
ð11Þ
and the proﬁts are
ui ¼ CC þ cið1þ aÞ ri  citi  ð/1s
2
i  /2s2j  /3sisjÞ
uj ¼ CC þ cjð1þ aÞ rj  cjtj  ð/1s
2
j  /2s2i  /3sisjÞ
U ¼ cið1þ aÞ
C þ cið1þ aÞ ri þ
cjð1þ aÞ
C þ cjð1þ aÞ rj  CðT i þ T jÞ
ð12Þ
The agent’s attacks and proﬁt depend on the aggregate defense tAi and t
A
j , and
not on how the ﬁrms allocate between security investment and information
sharing. Hence Ti, Tj, U depend on parameters only, and not on si and sj. In
(10), ti + csj and tj + csi also depend on parameters only. One ﬁrm’s security
investment and the other ﬁrm’s information sharing are strategic substitutes.
Increasing one decreases the other and vice versa.
Policy advice 2. By increasing its information sharing, one firm causes a decrease
in the other firm’s security investment. Conversely, by decreasing its information
sharing, one firm causes an increase in the other firm’s security investment. The
aggregate defense and attack, and the agent’s profit, remain unchanged as a
consequence of altering information sharing exogenously.
But the ﬁrms’ proﬁts depend on information sharing. To determine how, we
determine the ﬁrst and second derivatives of the proﬁts for each ﬁrm, where si
and sj are now variables,
oui
osi
¼ 2/1si þ /3sj;
o2ui
os2i
¼ 2/1;
ouj
osj
¼ 2/1sj þ /3si;
o2uj
os2j
¼ 2/1
ð13Þ
Setting the two FOCs in (13) equal to zero and solving gives si = sj = 0. This
can be interpreted as the solution of a two period game where the ﬁrms choose
information sharing independently and simultaneously in the ﬁrst period, while
the ﬁrms and agent choose security investments and attacks independently and
simultaneously in the second period. Such a game is solved with backward
recursion, starting with the second period which gives the solution in (10)
and (11), and proceeding with the ﬁrst period which gives si = sj = 0. This
means that not even interdependence between ﬁrms can generate information
sharing when the ﬁrms are requested to choose information sharing up front
in the ﬁrst period, postponing security investments and attacks to the second
period.
Consider ﬁrm i and assume that information sharing by ﬁrm j is exogenously
positive, sj > 0. Eq. (13) shows that ﬁrm i’s proﬁt increases in si when si = 0,
reaches a maximum when si = /3sj/2/1, and decreases when si > /3sj/2/1. That
is, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is inverse U shaped in its own information sharing. The prob-
lem is that ﬁrm i does not have any incentives to share information in the two
period game described here. Hence we introduce a social planner.5. Exogenously given security investment
As an alternative to given or imposed information sharing, assume ﬁxed
security investment. This may most commonly occur through budget con-
straints within ﬁrms, but may also be imposed by managerial decision, or an
agreement between ﬁrms, or other kinds of agreements, policies, laws, proce-
dures. For example, the Chief Financial Oﬃcer (CFO) may inform the Chief
Information Security Oﬃcer (CISO) that this year’s budget allows for a certain
security investment. A ﬁrm experiencing liquidity problems or other kinds of
hardship may very well decide that security investment has to be pushed down-
wards, possibly toward zero, in a given year. Conversely, the CFO may in a
given year decide that security investment is especially important, e.g. as a sig-
nal to customers, competitors, or others, and may inform the CISO that secu-
rity investment is going to be especially high this year, without regard for what
is optimal with respect to proﬁt maximization. Faced with such a constraint,
the CISO has to resort to his second free choice variable, information sharing,
to maximize proﬁts. We consider the symmetric case to ensure tractability. The
two last equations in (A.1) are the FOCs for information sharing when security
investment is exogenously given. Solving these together with the two equations
in (A.2) when ri = rj = r, ti = tj = t, si = sj = s, Ti = Tj = T gives
t ¼ Cra
2c2
½Cacþ sð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ2
 cs; T ¼ rsacð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ½Cacþ sð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ2
ð14Þ
We express t as a function of s rather than vice versa to avoid the third order
equation in s. In the other sections in this article, the aggregate defense and the
security investment depend on the attacker’s unit cost of attack C, while infor-
mation sharing does not. However, with exogenously given security invest-
ment, the only way to make the aggregate defense depend on C is to let
information sharing depend on C. Diﬀerentiating (14) gives
ot
os
¼ c 1þ 2Cra
2cð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ
½Cacþ sð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ3
!
< 0) os
ot
< 0
o2t
os2
¼ 6Cra
2c2ð1þ aÞ2ð2/1  /3Þ2
½Cacþ sð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ4
> 0) o
2s
ot2
> 0
oT
os
¼ racð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ½Cac sð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ½Cacþ sð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ3
> 0
when s <
Cac
ð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ
o2T
os2
¼  2racð1þ aÞ
2ð2/1  /3Þ2½2Cac sð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ
½Cacþ sð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ4
< 0
when s <
2Cac
ð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ
ð15Þ
which shows that the attack is inverse U shaped in information sharing. Eq.
(14) reduces to (8) when t has the equilibrium value in (8). Since t and s are stra-
tegic substitutes, decreasing (increasing) t below (above) this equilibrium value,
causes s to increase (decrease). Line 3 in Table 1 shows the equilibrium solution
with high exogenously given security investment t = 0.9. The ﬁrms free ride on
information sharing, s = 0.044, but welfare increases to w = 1.039. Fig. 2 illus-Fig. 2. t,s,T,u,U as functions of the agent’s attack eﬃciency 1/C, cf. Section 5.
trates with the same parameters as in Table 1 except that c = 1 which is disad-
vantageous for the ﬁrms by reducing t quickly to zero when 1/C > 5.70. Secu-
rity investment is inverse U formed in 1/C, consistently with Section 3. Observe
how information sharing when 1/C < 5.70 is constant at s = 0.125 independent
of 1/C, consistently with (8), and decreases when 1/C > 5.70, consistently with
this section and the inverse U form for the aggregate defense.6. Social planner controls information sharing
6.1. Two period game
For the issues regarding information sharing, especially in economic anal-
ysis, we care about the implication for public policy. Today’s governments
are concerned about the operation of information sharing organizations.
Welfare analysis is needed to show how regulation in the level of sharing
aﬀects the social welfare. Since the model allows cyber attacks to be variable,
the regulation about sharing depends upon the level of attacks. A social plan-
ner maximizes the joint proﬁt w = ui + uj of the two ﬁrms. This section
assumes that the social planner controls the information sharing variables
si and sj, but not the security investment variables ti and tj, which are still
controlled by the ﬁrms. There are thus four strategic actors who choose their
free choice variables optimally given the other actors’ choices. The external
agent’s free choice variable are as before, Ti and Tj. Essential in welfare anal-
ysis is a comparison of the social optimal and each individual ﬁrm’s optimal
levels of information sharing to see whether the social planner’s regulation is
more socially beneﬁcial than each individual ﬁrm’s free decisions. That is, will
each ﬁrm’s self-regulation result in an under-provided level of information
sharing?
This section assumes that the social planner chooses information sharing
simultaneously for both ﬁrms in the ﬁrst period, while the ﬁrms and agent
choose security investments and attacks independently and simultaneously
in the second period. This two period game is realistic when a credible social
planner, such as a SB/ISO, can commit the two ﬁrms in advance to the
speciﬁed information sharing levels. The commitment would operate espe-
cially well if it could be implemented in enforceable laws and procedures
backed with sanctions and punishment for noncompliance. This usually
requires a social planner who has built up a reputation over a long term
perspective, is well respected, and whose recommendations are taken seri-
ously. If such a commitment is suﬃciently strong, the levels of information
sharing speciﬁed by the social planner in the ﬁrst period are taken as given,
carved in stone of you like, by the ﬁrms and agent when they choose their
free choice variables in the second period. Defenses are usually built up over
time and it is usually realistic that the social planner moves ﬁrst and the
agent second.6
Solving with backward recursion, the second period solution is given by (10)
and (11). For the ﬁrst period, inserting (12) into w = ui + uj and diﬀerentiating
gives
ow
osi
¼ ccj 2½ð/1 /2Þsi/3sj ¼ 0;
ow
osj
¼ cci  2½ð/1/2Þsj/3si ¼ 0
ð16Þ
which are solved to yield
~si ¼ c½ð/1/2Þcjþ/3ci
2ð/1 /2/3Þð/1/2 þ/3Þ
; ~sj ¼ c½ð/1/2Þciþ/3cj
2ð/1/2/3Þð/1/2 þ/3Þ
ð17Þ
which is independent of a, where a curved line above a variable expresses wel-
fare analysis when the social planner controls information sharing in a two per-
iod game.
Proposition 4. (i) With equal unit costs ci = cj of security investment, social
optimal information sharing in a two period game is ~si ¼ cic=½2ð/1  /2  /3Þ,
which is more than 1/a times higher than the individual optimum. (ii) When ci = cj,
the social welfare loss from free riding in information sharing is
eL ¼ ~w w ¼ c2i c2½2/1  2að/1  /2  /3Þ  /32
2ð/1  /2  /3Þð2/1  /3Þ2
ð18Þ
which is always positive, where oeL=oa < 0; oeL=oci > 0; oeL=oc > 0. (iii) With unit
cost cj = 0 of security investment for the other firm j, and /2 = /3 = 0, the social
optimum for firm i is ~si ¼ 0 and ~sj ¼ cic=2/1, and the individual optimum is si =
ciac/2/1 and sj = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 2. h
Individually chosen information sharing depends crucially on the interdepen-
dence between ﬁrms. It equals zero with no interdependence, and increases pro-
portionally. In contrast, social optimal information sharing in a two period game6 This paper does not analyze the case that the agent moves ﬁrst, although that case is also
possible, e.g. when a hacker announces up front that a new attack will occur at some point in the
future (or simply commits resources to such an attack). In some such cases the social planner may
have to operate in an emergency response mode.
is independent of the interdependence. This explains that the social optimum is
more than 1/a times higher than the individual optimum when ci = cj, which is
high for low interdependence and equals inﬁnity with no interdependence.
The social welfare loss from free riding in information sharing is always
positive when ci = cj. Naturally, the loss decreases in the interdependence
which increases the individual optimum. Both optima increase in ci and c which
cause relative advantage to information sharing over security investment. But,
a social planner is better equipped to beneﬁt from this relative advantage, so
the welfare loss increases in ci and c.
~
Proposition 4(iii) illustrates that a social planner does not always recom-
mend more information sharing. Consider the special case where the other ﬁrm 
has zero unit cost of security investment, cj = 0. The other ﬁrm then does not 
share information, sj = 0, and ﬁrm i prefers individually to share at si = ciac/ 
2/1, see Section 3. The social planner imposes information sharing s~i ¼ 0 
and sj ¼ cic=2/1 when /2 = /3 = 0. Contrary to Section 3, the social planner 
imposes no information sharing on ﬁrm i (recall that /2 = /3 = 0 is a special 
case), which is far less than the individual optimum, and substantial informa-
tion sharing on ﬁrm j. The social planner does not tolerate the free riding of 
ﬁrm j caused by cj = 0. The sum of information sharing for the two ﬁrms is nev-
ertheless higher with than without a social planner also for this case, but only 
when a < 1. Although cj = 0 is a special case, it illustrates that when the unit 
cost of security investment is substantially less for the other ﬁrm, so that it 
would like to free ride, then the ﬁrst ﬁrm prefers to share more information 
individually than what a social planner recommends, while the reverse is the 
case for the other ﬁrm since the social planner does not tolerate free riding.
For the symmetric case ri = rj = r, ci = cj = c, the solution is
t ¼ Cr½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 
cc2
2ð/1  /2  /3Þ
P 0
s ¼ cc
2ð/1  /2  /3Þ
; T ¼ crð1þ aÞ½C þ cð1þ aÞ2
tAi ¼
Crð1þ aÞ
½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 ; T
A
i ¼
crð1þ aÞ2
½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 ;
tAi
T Ai
¼ C
cð1þ aÞ
u ¼ CrðC þ acÞ½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 þ
c2c2
4ð/1  /2  /3Þ
; w ¼ 2u; U ¼ 2c
2rð1þ aÞ2
½C þ cð1þ aÞ2
ð19Þ
Line 4 in Table 1 shows the equilibrium solution. Information sharing increases 
four times to s = 0.25 as enforced by the social planner. However, the ﬁrms re-
spond by free riding on security investment, which decreases from t = 0.5775 to 
t = 0.39. The aggregate attack and defense remain unchanged, so the attacker’s 
proﬁt remains unchanged. However, the social welfare, and thus the proﬁt for
each ﬁrm, increases to w = 1.085, in accordance with Proposition 4. Removing
free riding on information sharing causes increased information leakage costs,
but these are lower than the gains from reduced security investment.
The concern of the social planner is how to regulate the level of sharing in 
responding to certain level of attacks, in order to maximize the social welfare. 
Assuming that the ﬁrms retain their equilibrium security investment t = 0.39 
determined by (19), Fig. 3 illustrates how the social welfare w = 2u depends 
on information sharing s and attack T, determined by inserting the equilibrium 
value of t into Eq. (4) for the symmetric case allowing s and T to be free vari-
ables. The welfare of course increases as the attack decreases. But, as the attack 
decreases, note that the inverse U shape as a function of information sharing 
broadens. Too low information sharing is dysfunctional since a ﬁrm can boost 
its aggregate defense through information sharing. Too high information shar-
ing is also dysfunctional since the information sharing leakage costs become 
unbearable. Of course, when T = 0 , w decreases throughout in s since informa-
tion sharing is not necessary and only causes costs when there is no attack. 
Fig. 3 assumes a = 0.5, but visual inspection of Fig. 3 for other values of a sug-
gests that it is qualitatively similar also for other values of the interdependence.
6.2. Simultaneous game
Many of today’s SB/ISOs are in a buildup phase. Their inﬂuence is increas-
ing and they may become successful in the future. Whether their recommenda-
tions get the strength of law backed by sanctions remains to be seen. It is thusFig. 3. The social welfare w as a function of information sharing s and attack T, cf. Section 6.1.
of interest to analyze the case where the SB/ISO, the two ﬁrms, and the attack-
ing agent operate simultaneously. No actor is a ﬁrst mover. Nothing can be
taken as given ahead of anything else. The actors have a short term perspective,
or more speciﬁcally a static time perspective where they adapt to each other at
a speciﬁc point in time. Appendix 3 determines the six FOCs, the six choice
variables, and the proﬁts. Information sharing in (A.21) is
s^i ¼ c½ð/1  /2Þðcj þ aciÞ þ /3ðci þ acjÞ
2ð/1  /2  /3Þð/1  /2 þ /3Þ
ð20Þ
where a hat above a variable expresses welfare analysis when the social planner
controls information sharing in a simultaneous game.
Proposition 5. (i) Social optimal information sharing in a simultaneous game is
always higher than the social optimum in a two period game, s^i P ~si, and always
higher than the individual optimum. (ii) With equal unit costs ci = cj of security
investment, social optimal information sharing is s^i¼ cið1þaÞc=½2ð/1/2/3Þ,
which is 1 + a times higher than ~si, and more than (1 + a)/a times higher than the
individual optimum. (iii) The social welfare in a two period game minus the social
welfare in a simultaneous game is
bL ¼ ~w w^ ¼ a2c2½ðc2i þ c2j Þð/1  /2Þ þ 2cicj/3
4ð/1  /2  /3Þð/1  /2 þ /3Þ
ð21Þ
which is always positive. (iv) When ci cj and /2 = /3 = 0, the social welfare in a
simultaneous game minus the social welfare in the absence of a social planner is
w^ w ¼ c2i c2ð1 2aÞ=2/1, which is positive when a < 1/2. (v) When cj = 0 for
firm j, and /2 = /3 = 0, the social and individual optima coincide at si = acci/
2/1. (vi) The aggregate defense is the same for individual optimization and when
a social planner controls information sharing in a two period or simultaneous
game, though profits change.Proof. (i)–(v) See Appendix 3. (vi) Follows from comparing (A.7), (10) and 
(A.22). h
Proposition 5 shows that it is collectively beneﬁcial if the social planner can 
dictate information sharing in advance in a two period game, rather than oper-
ating simultaneously with the ﬁrms and the agent in a simultaneous game. In 
the simultaneous game the social planner dictates information sharing that is 
higher than in the two period game, which causes the ﬁrms to free ride more 
in their security investment. Since the aggregate defense and attack are the 
same in the simultaneous and two period game, the ﬁrms compensate for the 
required high information sharing in the simultaneous game by reducing secu-
rity investment so that tAi and t
A
j remain unchanged. Hence a simultaneous
game can be quite dysfunctional. The social planner knows that it can dictate
information sharing, but it cannot do so in advance. It compensates for this by
recommending an unreasonably high level of information sharing, and more
unreasonable when the interdependence is high, causing the ﬁrms to free ride.
Interestingly, without interdependence between ﬁrms, a = 0, the simultaneous
and two period game recommend the same levels of information sharing,
s^i ¼ ~si, which is higher than si = 0 for the individual optimum.
With equal unit costs ci = cj of security investment, the social planner in a
simultaneous game imposes at least twice as much information sharing as
the ﬁrms would individually choose with interdependence a = 1, at least three
times as much when a = 1/2, and substantially more with low interdependence
and as /2 increases, see (20). Recall that /2 is the eﬃciency of the other ﬁrm’s
leakage, which the social planner knows how to beneﬁt from.
A special case emergeswhen the other ﬁrmhas zero unit cost of security invest-
ment, cj = 0. The other ﬁrm then does not need to share information, sj = 0, and
ﬁrm i prefers to share at si = ciac/2/1, when given individual choices and /3 = 0,
see (6). The social planner imposes information sharing s^i ¼ ciac=2/1 and
s^j ¼ cic=2/1 when /2 = /3 = 0. Hence the only case when the social planner
imposes information sharing down toward that level chosen individually by a
ﬁrm, is when the other ﬁrm has very low unit cost of security investment.
We know from Section 6.1 that the ﬁrms always prefer a social planner in a 
two period game. Proposition 5 speciﬁes that they do not always prefer a social 
planner in a simultaneous game. The question is whether each ﬁrm prefers a 
social planner which causes increased leakage costs due to high information 
sharing but also reduced cost of security investment due to free riding. Using 
(A.9) and (A.24), the social welfare with a social planner minus the social wel-
fare without a social planner when ci = cj is
w^ w ¼ ½c2i c2ð4ð1 2aÞ/21 þ /23  4a/3ð/2 þ /3Þ
þ a2ð4/22 þ 8/2/3 þ 3/23Þ  4/1ð/3 þ a2ð2/2 þ /3Þ
 að2/2 þ 3/3ÞÞÞ=½2ð/1  /2  /3Þð2/1  /3Þ2 ð22Þ
which is positive when
w^ w > 0 when a < 2/1  /3
4/1  2/2  3/3
¼ aT ð23Þ
where aTP 1/2. This means that the ﬁrms prefer a social planner controlling
information sharing only when the interdependence is lower than aT. When
the interdependence is higher than aT, the unreasonably high degree of infor-
mation sharing imposed by the social planner operating simultaneously causes
too much leakage costs. The ﬁrms respond by free riding substantially on secu-
rity investment, lowering the cost of security investment. However, the infor-
mation sharing leakage costs are already unbearable for the ﬁrms when a is
high. Hence we propose the following policy advice.
Policy advice 3. A social planner that controls information sharing in a
simultaneous game is advised to assess the interdependence a between the firms
in relation to the information leakage parameters /1, /2, /3 as determined by
(23). When the interdependence is high, a > aT, the firms are collectively better
off if they are allowed to regulate their information sharing themselves without
external interference, or if a social planner can be generated which operates in
advance in a two period game. When the interdependence is low, a < aT, and
especially for firms that operate in isolation from each other without
interdependence, a social planner regulating information sharing is collectively
beneficial.
Line 5 in Table 1 shows the equilibrium solution. Information sharing 
increases 50% to s = 0.375. Preventing the social planner to behave in advance 
causes it to impose a suboptimally high level of information sharing. The ﬁrms 
respond by free riding even more on security investment, which decreases to 
t = 0.265. The social welfare decreases to w = 1.054.7. Social planner controls security investment: simultaneous game
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act places strict requirements on ﬁrms, such as 
establishing and maintaining adequate internal controls for ﬁnancial reporting, 
and assessing annually the eﬀectiveness of those controls. SB/ISOs encourage 
ﬁrms to share information. The future will likely show attempts to work incen-
tives, inducements, and possibly requirements to share information, into laws 
and regulations. Given the plethora of requirements for ﬁrms, a possible fur-
ther development is to induce or require ﬁrms to invest in security in certain 
manners. One example is requirements that certain security installations and 
procedures have to be in place, analogous to airlines being required to meet 
certain minimum standards. Another example is requirements to invest a cer-
tain percentage of proﬁt into security, analogous to taxation, or to invest cer-
tain amounts determined by the size, type, nature, or other characteristics of 
the ﬁrm. Security investment may alternatively be controlled by a budget 
imposed or dictated by someone else than the decision makers within the ﬁrm 
who usually make optimizing decisions. For example, the budget may be deter-
mined by the CEO overruling the CISO who may usually make security deci-
sions, or determined in some manner within the ﬁrm inﬂuenced by historic 
events or future goals or external conditions, or determined by shareholders, 
or determined by laws and regulations designed to reach societal or other 
goals. We refer to these examples as the case when the social planner deter-
mines security investment. This case constitutes an interesting and clear bench-
mark. More speciﬁcally, this section assumes that the social planner controls 
security investment, the ﬁrms control information sharing, and the attacker 
controls the attack. Appendix 4 determines the solution. 
The symmetric solution is
t ¼ CrðC þ cÞ2 
cac2
ð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ
P 0
s ¼ cacð1þ aÞð2/1  /3Þ
; T ¼ cr½C þ c2
tAi ¼
Crð1þ aÞ
½C þ c2 ; T
A
i ¼
crð1þ aÞ
½C þ c2 ;
tAi
T Ai
¼ C
c
u ¼ C
2r
ðC þ cÞ2 þ
c2ac2½ð2þ aÞ/1 þ a/2  /3
ð1þ aÞ2ð2/1  /3Þ2
; w ¼ 2u; U ¼ 2c
2r
½C þ c2
ð24Þ
Proposition 6. (i) Firm i’s individually optimal information sharing in a
simultaneous game when the social planner controls security investment, but not
information sharing, is lower than in the individual optimization case without the
social planner’s control when ci < cj(2/1  a /3)/(2a/1  /3), which is satisfied in
the symmetric case when a < 1. (ii) The social planner dictates more security
investment than when the firms optimize individually.
Proof. (i) Follows from comparing (A.27) and (6). (ii) The ﬁrst positive term in 
the expression for t in (24) is larger than the corresponding ﬁrst term in (8). The 
second negative term in the expression for t in (24) has smaller absolute value 
than the corresponding second term in (8). h
Note that (2/1  a/3)/(2a/1  /3) P 1. This proposition shows that unless 
one’s own unit cost of security investment is suﬃciently higher than in the 
other ﬁrm, a ﬁrm free rides even more on information sharing when security 
investment is dictated by a social planner. Line 6 in Table 1 shows how the 
social planner increases security investment to the extremely high level 
t = 0.958. This is reminiscent of Section 6.1 where the social planner chooses 
extremely high information sharing. That is, the social planner imposes a high 
value for the variable it controls, and the ﬁrms respond by free riding and 
choosing a low value for the variable they control. As the social planner 
chooses high t, the ﬁrms choose very low information sharing s = 0.042. The 
social welfare is w = 1.038, slightly lower than when t is given at t = 0.9.
Policy advice 4. A social planner or budget controlling only security investment
should be aware that dictating high security investment causes the firms to free
ride more on information sharing than if the firms control both security investment
and information sharing.
The third order equation for s in (14) implies that a two period game where
the social planner controls security investment is analytically cumbersome, and
is not analyzed.8. Social planner controls both information sharing and security investment
The results in the previous sections raise the issue of whether a social plan-
ner should be allowed to control both information sharing and security invest-
ment. The ﬁrms can then free ride neither on information sharing nor on
security investment. This leaves the ﬁrms without free choice variables, while
the social planner has four free choice variables ti, si, tj, sj, and maximizes
the joint proﬁt w = ui + uj of the two ﬁrms. The external agent’s free choice
variable are as before, Ti and Tj.
8.1. Simultaneous game
We ﬁrst consider the simultaneous game. Appendix 5 determines the six 
FOCs, the six choice variables, and the three proﬁts. Information sharing in 
(A.33) is
si ¼ c½ð/1  /2Þcj þ /3ci
2ð/1  /2  /3Þð/1  /2 þ /3Þ
¼ ~si ð25Þ
which happens to be equivalent to the information sharing in the two period
game in (17) in Section 6.1 where the social planner controls information sharing
in a two period game. A bar above a variable expresses welfare analysis when the
social planner controls both information sharing and security investment.
Proposition 7. (i) Social optimal information sharing when the social planner
controls both information sharing and security investment in a simultaneous game
is equal to the social optimum in a two period game where the social planner
controls only information sharing, si ¼ ~si. (ii) In the symmetric case ri = rj = r,
ci = cj = c, the social welfare when the social planner controls both information
sharing and security investment minus the social welfare in a two period game
where the social planner controls only information sharing is
w ~w ¼ 2acCr½C
2  c2 þ acC
½C þ c2½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 > 0 when c <
C aþ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃa2 þ 4p 
2
ð26Þ
Proof. (i) Follows from comparing (25) and (17). (ii) Follows from inserting (10),
(11), (17) into (12) and applying ~w ¼ ~ui þ ~uj, and applyingAppendix 5 for w. h
When the social planner controls both information sharing and security invest-
ment, it refrains from imposing dysfunctionally high information sharing such
as in the simultaneous game where the social planner controls only information
sharing. Comparing (19) and (A.38), note thatt > ~t, which means that the social
planner eliminates free riding in security investment, requiring the ﬁrms to in-
vest more than when the ﬁrms individually choose security investment. Whether
this gives higher proﬁt for the ﬁrms depends also on the attacker, which the so-
cial planner does not control. When the attacker has a unit cost C of attack that
is suﬃciently high, as expressed with the rightmost inequality in (26), the ﬁrms
prefer the simultaneous game where the social planner controls both informa-
tion sharing and security investment. The reason is that the attacker draws an
advantage from the two period game when its unit cost of attack is low, which
enables it to launch a detrimental attack in the second period.7
The aggregate attack and defense are no longer the same when the social 
planner controls both information sharing and security investment, see 
(A.37) and (7). Comparing (A.38) and (8) for the symmetric case, the aggregate
defense ti
A increases, the aggregate attack T i
A decreases, and the agent’s proﬁt U 
decreases. Hence the ﬁrms’ proﬁts u increases due to eliminating free riding. 
Both Eqs. (17) and (18) are positive, where we have inserted C = c and C = 0 to 
simplify complex expressions. This means that for these special cases, it is 
beneﬁcial to let a social planner control both information sharing and secu-rity 
investment. We propose the following policy advice.
Policy advice 5. A social planner that controls both information sharing and
security investment in a simultaneous game imposes less information sharing than
a social planner that controls only information sharing, but more than the
individual optimum. The reason is that a social planner controlling only
information sharing compensates for not controlling security investment, to
which the firms respond by free riding on security investment.
Line 7 in Table 1 shows the equilibrium solution. Information sharing 
decreases back to s = 0.25, as in the two period game. But, security investment 
which is now controlled by the social planner increases substantially to 
t = 0.75. Hence no free riding. Neither the aggregate defense nor attack remain 
the same. The attacker responds to the improved defense by increasing the 
attack marginally from to T = 1, but earns a lower proﬁt U = 1. The ﬁrms, 
however, enjoy the high social welfare w = 1.125.7 Many games can be envisioned when two ﬁrms, an attacker, and a social planner are involved.
The author has analyzed some of these other games, but they are not included due to space
constraints. For example, the social planner may choose information sharing and security
investment in the ﬁrst period, while the attacker chooses the attack in the second period, or vice
versa. Alternatively, a three period game may be envisioned (which can be sequenced in six diﬀerent
ways). Also, a game can be envisioned where the social planner controls the attacker as well,
though the social planner will then eliminate the attack.
To sum up our example, consider Fig. 4 which for the same parameter val-
ues shows the security investment and social welfare with individual optimiza-
tion (Section 3), and when the social planner controls information sharing in a
two period game (Section 6.1) and simultaneous game (Section 6.2). (The
aggregate defense and attack remain the same.) Zero information sharing gives
high security investment. As information sharing increases to the ﬁrst vertical
line s = 0.0625 (individual optimization), security investment decreases and
social welfare increases. As information sharing increases to the second vertical
line s = 0.25 (two period game), security investment decreases and social wel-
fare increases to its maximum. As information sharing increases to the third
vertical line s = 0.375 (simultaneous game), security investment decreases
and social welfare decreases from its maximum.
8.2. Two period game
This section assumes that the social planner controls information sharing
and security investment in the ﬁrst period, while the attacker controls the
attack in the second period. Appendix 6 gives the solution which is the same
as for the simultaneous game for information sharing, while security invest-
ment and the attack are diﬀerent. The symmetric case becomes
t¼ Cr
4c2
 cc
2
2ð/1/2/3Þ
P 0; s¼ cc
2ð/1/2/3Þ
; T ¼ ð2cCÞr
4c2
P 0
tAi ¼
Crð1þ aÞ
4c2
; T Ai ¼
ð2cCÞrð1þ aÞ
4c2
;
tAi
T Ai
¼ C
2cC
u¼Cr
4c
þ c
2c2
4ð/1/2/3Þ
; w¼ 2u; U ¼ ð2cCÞ
2r
2c2
ð27ÞFig. 4. Security investment and social welfare as functions of information sharing, cf. Section 8.1.
Proposition 8. (i) Social optimal information sharing when the social planner
controls both information sharing and security investment is the same in the two
period and simultaneous game. (ii) In the symmetric case ri = rj = r, ci = cj = c,
c < C causes larger security investment and profit for the firms, and lower attack
and profit for the agent, in the two period game than in the simultaneous game.
Proof. (i) Follows from comparing (A.33) with Appendix 6. (ii) Follows from 
comparing (27) and (A.38). h
This proposition shows that when the defense eﬃciency 1/c of the ﬁrms is
higher than the attack eﬃciency 1/C of the agent, then a social planner who
controls both information sharing and security investment is more beneﬁcial
for the ﬁrms in a two period game than in a simultaneous game. Allowing a
social planner to move ﬁrst is beneﬁcial for the ﬁrms when advantaged in terms
of defense eﬃciency, but not when disadvantaged in terms of defense eﬃciency.
As a second mover, the agent observes the high defense, and reduces the attack
below that of the simultaneous game. Even more detrimentally to the agent,
when c 6 C/2, the attack in (27) ceases, causing zero proﬁt to the agent. Line
7 in Table 1 is for the two period and simultaneous game always equivalent for
information sharing, but is for c = C equivalent for all the variables.
Policy advice 6. Allowing a social planner to control both information sharing
and security investment in a two period game where the social planner moves first
is the most beneficial control scenario when the firms’ defense efficiencies are high.
If these are sufficiently high, the attack is deterred altogether.9. Which games and control scenarios do the agent and social planner prefer
Table 2 shows the social welfare and agent proﬁt for the various sections.
We ﬁrst consider the agent. The agent proﬁt is the same for Sections 3, 6.1,
6.2 since, as we observed in Section 4, the agent’s attacks and proﬁt depend on
the aggregate defense, and not on how the ﬁrms allocate between security
investment and information sharing. The agent proﬁt is the same for Sections
7 and 8.1 for the same reason. In some cases, e.g. when the social planner has
not committed to a defense in the ﬁrst period, the agent may have a choice
whether to attack simultaneously with the social planner, or to postpone the
attack to the second period. Considering the symmetric case in Section 8 where
the social planner controls both information sharing and security investment,
the agent prefers the simultaneous game when the proﬁt U in (A.38) is larger
than the proﬁt in the two period game in (27), that is, when
2c2r
½C þ c2 >
ð2c CÞ2r
2c2
) c=C < 1 ð28Þ
l 
Table 2
Social welfare w and agent proﬁt U in symmetric game
Section Optimization w U
3 Individual ﬁrm and agent
optimization, (8)
2CrðCþcaÞ
½Cþcð1þaÞ2 þ
2c2ac2 ½ð2aÞ/1þa/2ð1aÞ/3 
ð2/1/3Þ2
2c2rð1þaÞ2
½Cþcð1þaÞ2
6.1 Social planner controls information
sharing: Two period game, (19)
2CrðCþcaÞ
½Cþcð1þaÞ2 þ
c2c2
2ð/1/2/3Þ
2c2rð1þaÞ2
½Cþcð1þaÞ2
6.2 Social planner controls information
sharing: Simultaneous game, (A.25)
2CðCþcaÞ
ðCþcð1þaÞÞ2 r þ
c2ð1a2Þc2
2ð/1/2/3Þ
2c2rð1þaÞ2
½Cþcð1þaÞ2
7 Social planner controls security
investment: Simultaneous game, (24)
2C2r
ðCþcÞ2 þ
2c2ac2 ½ð2þaÞ/1þa/2/3 
ð1þaÞ2ð2/1/3Þ2
2c2r
½Cþc2
8.1 Social planner controls both
information sharing and security
investment: Simultaneous game,
(A.38)
2C2r
ðCþcÞ2 þ
c2c2
2ð/1/2/3Þ
2c2r
½Cþc2
8.2 Social planner controls both
information sharing and security
investment: Two period game, (27)
Cr
2c þ c
2c2
2ð/1/2/3Þ
ð2cCÞ2r
2c2When c/C = 1, the equal unit costs cause the agents to be equally strong, and
the agent is indiﬀerent between the two games. As c/C decreases below 1, the
social planner grows stronger. To prevent the social planner from exploiting
its ﬁrst mover advantage when in a stronger position, the agent prefers the
simultaneous game. Conversely, as c/C increases above 1, the social planner be-
comes weaker, and the agent prefers to exploit or expose the social planner’s
weakness by letting it move ﬁrst with modest and costly security investment.
We second consider the social planner. For the symmetric case in Section 8
where the social planner controls both information sharing and security invest-
ment, the social planner prefers the simultaneous game when the social welfare
w in (A.38) is larger than the social welfare in the two period game in (27), that
is, when
2C2r
ðC þ cÞ2 þ
c2c2
2ð/1  /2  /3Þ
>
Cr
2c
þ c
2c2
2ð/1  /2  /3Þ
) ðC  cÞ2 < 0; never satisfied ð29Þ
Hence the social planner unconditionally prefers the two period game, which
requires more commitment as discussed in Section 6.1, and is indiﬀerent be-
tween the two games when c/C = 1.
The other control scenarios are more elaborate to compare, so let us consider 
variation relative to the baseline parameter values in Table 1, i.e. a = c = C = 
0.5, c = /2 = 1 , r = /1 = 2 , /3 = 0 . Fig. 5 lets a vary, and plots the socia
welfare and agent proﬁt. The number behind the variables, w or U, refers to
Fig. 5. Social welfare and agent proﬁt as functions of interdependence a, cf. Section 9.the section number. With individual optimization, or when the social planner 
controls information sharing, the agent’s proﬁt increases from 1. When the 
social planner controls security investment (regardless of whether also control-
ling information sharing), the agent earns lower proﬁt at 1. The social welfare is 
lowest with individual optimization, with the one exception that the social plan-
ner controls information sharing in the simultaneous game and a > 2/3. This 
ﬁnding is supported by Proposition 5 and the discussion thereafter in Section 
6.2. Lacking control over security investment, the social planner dictates unrea-
sonably large information sharing, especially when the interdependence is high, 
causing the ﬁrms to free ride, and to prefer individual optimization. However, 
social welfare is always higher when the social planner controls security invest-
ment, compared with individual optimization. With low interdependence, the 
ﬁrms prefer the social planner to control information sharing, and with high 
interdependence, the ﬁrms prefer the social planner to control security invest-
ment. The most preferable control scenario for the ﬁrms is that the social plan-
ner controls both information sharing and security investment.
Resetting a = 0.5, Fig. 6 lets c vary. With individual optimization, or when 
the social planner controls information sharing, the agent’s proﬁt is highest 
when c < 1. In accordance with (28), when c > 0.5 the agent prefers the two 
period game where the social planner controls both information sharing and 
security investment, rather than the simultaneous game where the social plan-
ner controls at least security investment, and conversely when c < 0.5. The 
social welfare decreases in c towards a minimum and increases when c becomes 
especially large. The reason for this increase is that the ﬁrms substitute from 
especially costly security investment and into information sharing. Recall that 
c = 1 means that information from the other ﬁrm is as valuable as own security 
investment when it comes to contesting the agent’s attack. The social welfare is 
lowest with individual optimization, but here with the one exception that the 
social planner controls security investment in the simultaneous game and
Fig. 6. Social welfare and agent proﬁt as functions of unit cost c of investment, cf. Section 9.c > 0.56. This ﬁnding is supported by Proposition 6(ii) which states that the 
social planner dictates more security investment than when the ﬁrms optimize 
individually. This is especially costly when the unit cost c of security investment 
is high, and the ﬁrms free ride on information sharing. The most beneﬁcial con-
trol scenario for the social planner is to control both information sharing and 
security investment in a two period game, but controlling only information 
sharing in a two period game is also beneﬁcial when the unit cost c of security 
investment is high. With high c this beneﬁt is higher than when controlling 
both information sharing and security investment in a simultaneous game.10. Conclusion
Information sharing and security investment gradually become more impor-
tant for accounting and public policy. The establishment of Security Based
Information Sharing Organizations, and the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, have
strengthened internal controls. Accounting means representing information
in certain formats and on chosen media, and administering controls for gener-
ating and disseminating information with tradeoﬀs between availability and
conﬁdentiality. Assessing costs and beneﬁts of information sharing and secu-
rity investment, interlinked with other strategies to gain competitive advantage,
needs an accounting foundation. The security of an interlinked information
system depends on the strategies about information sharing and security
investment chosen by all actors, those that are players in it, those that attempt
to regulate and reshape it, and those that attempt to shut it down, which opens
a role for public policy.
This article considers two ﬁrms subject to cyber attacks by an external agent.
The ﬁrms defend themselves by sharing information with each other, and
investing in security. The agent chooses the optimal attacks, which is costly and
consists in breaking through the security defense to appropriate something of
value in the ﬁrms. The ﬁrms collect information about security breaches. Each
ﬁrm prefers to receive information about the other ﬁrm’s security breaches.
Providing information to the other ﬁrm is costly because of the risk of leakage.
The article analyzes the extent to which a ﬁrm has incentives to provide infor-
mation voluntarily to the other ﬁrm, and the tradeoﬀs each ﬁrm makes between
sharing information and investing in security.
The classical free rider dilemma explains why information sharing often does 
not occur, as also found by Gordon et al. (2003). This article shows that 
information sharing increases linearly in the interdependence between ﬁrms, 
and is zero with negative or no interdependence. The US telecommunications 
industry is highly interdependent, and also quite competitive, with substantial 
information sharing. We suggest that it is the interdependence between ﬁrms, 
and not the competitiveness, that is the key determinator of information shar-
ing. Future empirical research may consider industries with diﬀerent degrees of 
interdependence, competitiveness, and other characteristics to determine the 
impact on information sharing.
As the unit cost of security investment increases, a ﬁrm shifts its emphasis
toward more information sharing to maintain its defense, given that the inter-
dependence is positive. This shift is such that information sharing increases lin-
early more in one’s own than in the other ﬁrm’s unit cost of security
investment. High unit cost of security investment, interdependence, and eﬀec-
tiveness of information sharing relative to security investment boost informa-
tion sharing. Information sharing and aggregate attack are interlinked
through the interdependence and the ﬁrm’s unit cost of security investment.
Both increase in the interdependence.
Security investment depends fundamentally on almost all the parameters in
the model. In contrast, information sharing depends on fewer concerns which
are the interdependence between ﬁrms, the information sharing parameters,
and both ﬁrms’ unit costs of security investment. A ﬁrm’s aggregate defense,
which is a weighted sum of information sharing and security investment, is
inverse U shaped in the aggregate attack. When the defense is weak, the agent
is successful even with a modest attack. As the defense increases, so does the
attack toward a maximum, and it thereafter decreases. When the defense is suf-
ﬁciently strong, the agent gives up and refrains from attacking. The security
investment and aggregate defense are maximum when the attack is large
enough to pose a threat, while at the same time the ﬁrms can limit that threat
by designing a suﬃcient defense.
For the symmetric case, information sharing increases, and security invest-
ment decreases, in the interdependence. The agent’s proﬁt increases in the
interdependence, since both ﬁrms then can be attacked more thoroughly. A
main ﬁnding in this article is that high interdependence between ﬁrms facili-
tates information sharing. When, additionally, the unit cost of security invest-
ment is large, information sharing increases further. This suppresses free rid-
ing in information sharing, and the ﬁrms’ proﬁt increases in the
interdependence. A two period game where the ﬁrms choose information
sharing in the ﬁrst period, while security investments and attacks occur in
the second period, implies that not even interdependence between ﬁrms can
generate information sharing.
Individual optimization implies free riding especially in information sharing,
but also in security investment with positive interdependence since the ﬁrms cash
in on each other’s investments. Security Based Information Sharing Organiza-
tions (SB/ISOs) have emerged to facilitate increased information sharing. To
understand the operation of such organizations, a social planner is analyzed
which, together with budget control mechanisms, control information sharing
only, security investment only, or both, in a simultaneous game, and two period
game.
Two period games where the social planner moves in the ﬁrst period are real-
istic when the social planner is reputed, when the recommendations are taken
seriously, and especially when the recommendations are enforceable. In a two
period game where the social planner chooses information sharing in the ﬁrst
period, and equal unit costs of security investment, social optimal information
sharing is higher than the individual optimum, especially with low interdepen-
dence, and the social welfare loss from free riding in information sharing is posi-
tive. However, the ﬁrms respond by free riding more on security investment.
Removing free riding on information sharing causes increased information leak-
age costs, but these are lower than the gains from reduced security investment.
When security investment is given, the social welfare is inverse U shaped in
information sharing, and decreases in the attack. Too low information sharing
is dysfunctional since a ﬁrm can boost its aggregate defense through informa-
tion sharing. Too high information sharing is also dysfunctional since the
information sharing leakage costs become unbearable.
In cases when SB/ISOs have limited reputation and capacity to operate in
advance, a simultaneous game is realistic. The social welfare in a simultaneous
game is lower than in the two period game since the social planner recommends
unreasonably high information sharing in the simultaneous game, to which the
ﬁrms respond by free riding more on security investment. The aggregate
defense is the same for individual optimization and when a social planner con-
trols information sharing in a two period or simultaneous game, though proﬁts
change.
A simultaneous game can be quite dysfunctional. The social planner knows
that it can dictate information sharing, but it cannot do so in advance. It
compensates for this by recommending an unreasonably high level of informa-
tion sharing, and more unreasonable when the interdependence is high, causing
the ﬁrms to free ride on security investment. Without interdependence, the
simultaneous and two period game recommend the same levels of information
sharing, which is higher than zero information sharing for the individual
optimum.
The ﬁrms always prefer a social planner in a two period game where the
social planner controls information sharing. Because of the very high informa-
tion sharing imposed by a social planner in a simultaneous game, the ﬁrms pre-
fer a social planner in a simultaneous game when the interdependence is low,
since free riding in information sharing is then substantial, and otherwise prefer
to self regulate information sharing.
These results raise the issue of whether a social planner, combined with
various control and budget mechanisms, should control both information
sharing and security investment. For the simultaneous game, interestingly,
the social planner recommends the same information sharing as in the two
period game when controlling only information sharing. The social planner
refrains from imposing dysfunctionally high information sharing, and elimi-
nates free riding in security investment. Neither the aggregate defense nor
attack remain the same. Whether this gives higher proﬁt for the ﬁrms depends
also on the attacker, which the social planner does not control. When the
attacker has a high unit cost of attack, the ﬁrms prefer the simultaneous game
where the social planner controls both information sharing and security
investment.
For the two period game where the social planner moves ﬁrst, and controls
both information sharing and security investment, information sharing
remains the same. In the symmetric case, if the ﬁrms’ unit cost of security
investment is lower than the agent’s unit cost of attack, the two period game
causes larger security investment and proﬁt for the ﬁrms, and lower attack
and proﬁt for the agent, than the simultaneous game. Allowing a social planner
to control both information sharing and security investment in a two period
game where the social planner moves ﬁrst is the most beneﬁcial control sce-
nario when the ﬁrms’ defense eﬃciencies are high. If these are suﬃciently high,
the attack is deterred altogether.
A ﬁnal alternative is that a social planner or budget controls security invest-
ment only. This may occur through budget constraints within ﬁrms, manage-
rial decisions, agreements, policies, laws, procedures. For this case
information sharing depends also on the attacker’s characteristics. The attack
is inverse U shaped in information sharing. A ﬁrm’s individually optimal infor-
mation sharing in a simultaneous game when the social planner controls secu-
rity investment, but not information sharing, is lower than in the individual
optimization case without the social planner’s control when the unit cost of
security investment is not too high compared with the other ﬁrm, which is
always satisﬁed in the symmetric case. This means that a ﬁrm free rides even
more on information sharing when security investment is dictated by a social
planner or budget. In other words, the social planner compensates for not
controlling information sharing by imposing unreasonably high security invest-
ment, analogously to the case above where the social planner compensates for
not controlling security investment by imposing unreasonably high informa-
tion sharing.
To facilitate increased information sharing, ﬁrms are well advised to build
up increased interdependence with other ﬁrms. To the extent costs of security
investment increase, ﬁrms need to assess the tradeoﬀ toward sharing more
information, in the light of incentives on both sides to free ride. As the volume
and scope of cyber attacks and industrial espionage increase, ﬁrms are advised
to collect, categorize, and distribute, in the optimal amounts speciﬁed in this
article, information about security breaches through SB/ISOs to other ﬁrms.
A social planner needs to pay explicit attention to how the magnitude and
scope of its control scenario interacts with budget control mechanisms, to
ensure that it recommends and enforces optimal strategies, to avoid that ﬁrms
do not respond suboptimally with free riding in strategies outside the social
planner’s control.Acknowledgements
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two anonymous referees for their useful comments.Appendix 1. Individual ﬁrm and agent optimization, cf. Section 3
The two ﬁrms’ FOCs are
oui
oti
¼ T i þ aT j½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
ri  ci ¼ 0
ouj
otj
¼ T j þ aT i½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
rj  cj ¼ 0
oui
osi
¼ T i þ aT j½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
acri  2/1si þ /3sj ¼ 0
ouj
osj
¼ T j þ aT i½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
acrj  2/1sj þ /3si ¼ 0
ðA:1Þ
The agent’s FOCs are
oU
oT i
¼ ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
ri
þ tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
arj  C ¼ 0
oU
oT j
¼ ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
ari
þ tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
rj  C ¼ 0
ðA:2Þ
Dividing the ﬁrst line in (A.2) with a and subtracting the second line gives
T i þ aT j ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
½ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞð1þ aÞri
C
r
 ½ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
ðA:3Þ
Dividing the second line in (A.2) with a and subtracting from the ﬁrst line gives
T j þ aT i ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
½tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞð1þ aÞrj
C
r
 ½tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
ðA:4Þ
Inserting (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.1) gives
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
q
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Crið1þ aÞ
p
C þ cið1þ aÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
q
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Crjð1þ aÞ
p
C þ cjð1þ aÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
q
¼ ac
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Crið1þ aÞ
p
Cacþ ð1þ aÞð2/1si  /3sjÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
q
¼ ac
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Crjð1þ aÞ
p
Cacþ ð1þ aÞð2/1sj  /3siÞ
ðA:5Þ
Equating the ﬁrst and third line in (A.5) gives an equation with si and sj. Equat-
ing the second and fourth line in (A.5) gives a second equation with si and sj. 
Solving these two equations gives
si ¼ acð2/1ci þ /3cjÞð2/1  /3Þð2/1 þ /3Þ
; sj ¼ acð2/1cj þ /3ciÞð2/1  /3Þð2/1 þ /3Þ
ðA:6Þ
Inserting (A.6) into (A.5) and solving with respect to ti and tj gives
ti ¼ C
1 a
ri
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
 arj½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
!
 csj
tj ¼ C
1 a
rj
½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
 ari½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
!
 csi
ðA:7Þ
Inserting (A.6) and (A.7) into (A.3) and (A.4) and solving with respect to Ti 
and Tj gives
T i ¼ ð1þ aÞð1 aÞ
ciri
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
 acjrj½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
!
T j ¼ ð1þ aÞð1 aÞ
cjrj
½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
 aciri½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
! ðA:8Þ
Inserting into (4) gives
ui ¼ CC þ cið1þ aÞ ri  citi  ð/1s
2
i  /2s2j  /3sisjÞ
uj ¼ CC þ cjð1þ aÞ rj  cjtj  ð/1s
2
j  /2s2i  /3sisjÞ
U ¼ ð1þ aÞ2 c
2
i ri
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
þ c
2
j rj
½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
! ðA:9Þ
Diﬀerentiating (7) gives
oT Ai
oa
¼ 2Ccirið1þ aÞ½C þ cið1þ aÞ3
ðA:10Þ
oT Ai
oci
¼ rið1þ aÞ
2½C  cið1þ aÞ
½C þ cið1þ aÞ3
ðA:11Þ
oT Ai
ori
¼ cið1þ aÞ
2
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
ðA:12Þ
otAi
oa
¼ Cri½C  cið1þ aÞ½C þ cið1þ aÞ3
ðA:13Þ
otAi
oC
¼ rið1þ aÞ½C þ cið1þ aÞ½C þ cið1þ aÞ3
ðA:14Þ
Diﬀerentiating the utilities for the symmetric case gives
ou
oa
¼ c Crðcð1 aÞ  CÞ½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 þ
cc2½2ð1 aÞð/1  /3Þ þ 2a/2 þ /3
ð2/1  /3Þ2
" #
lim
c!1
ou
oa
¼ 1 ðA:15Þ
oU
oa
¼ 4c
2Crð1þ aÞ
½C þ cð1þ aÞ3 ðA:16ÞAppendix 2. A social planner controls information sharing in a two period game,
cf. Section 6.1
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Follows from inserting ci = cj into (17) and
comparing with si = cia c/(2/1  /3) in (8). The factor 1/a follows since 2(/1 
/2  /3) < 2/1  /3. (ii) Follows from inserting (10), (11), (17) into (12) and
applying ~w ¼ ~ui þ ~uj for the social optimum, and inserting (A.6), (A.7) and
(A.8) into (A.9) and applying w = ui + uj for the individual optimum. The
inequalities follow from differentiating (18). (iii) Follows from inserting into
(17) and (6).Appendix 3. A social planner controls information sharing in a simultaneous
game, cf. Section 6.2
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) The denominators in (17) and (19) are equivalent.
Comparing the numerators, s^i P ~si follows immediately. Observe /1  /2 once
in the numerator in (19) and twice (multiplicatively) in the denominator.
Replacing the three occurrences of /1  /2 with /1 gives a lower amount s^iL of
information sharing which we write as
s^iL ¼ c/1ðcj þ aciÞ
2ð/1  /3Þð/1 þ /3Þ
þ c/3ðci þ acjÞ
2ð/1  /3Þð/1 þ /3Þ
6 s^i ðA:17Þ
We write (6) as
si ¼ ac/1cið2/1  /3Þð2/1 þ /3Þ=2
þ ac/3cj=2ð2/1  /3Þð2/1 þ /3Þ=2
ðA:18Þ
Both numerators in (A.17) are larger than the corresponding numerators in
(A.18). The denominators in (A.17) can be written as 2/21  2/23, which is lower
than the denominators in (A.18) which can be written as 2/21  /23=2. Hence
s^iL > si. (ii) Follows from inserting ci = cj into (19) and (17) and comparing
with si = ciac/(2/1  /3) in (8). The factor (1 + a)/a increases from 2 to inﬁnity
as a decreases from one to zero, and follows since 2(/1  /2  /3) < 2/1  /3.
(iii) Follows from inserting (10), (11), (17) into (12) and applying ~w ¼ ~ui þ ~uj
for the two period social optimum, and applying Appendix 3 for the simulta-
neous social optimum. (iv) Follows from inserting into (A.9) and (A.24). (v)
Follows from inserting into (19) and (6).
Assume that each ﬁrm continues to control its security investment, ti and tj,
with FOCs as in (A.1). A social planner controls information sharing si and sj
and maximizes the joint proﬁt w = ui + uj. This gives the FOCs
oui
oti
¼ T i þ aT j½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
ri  ci ¼ 0
ouj
otj
¼ T j þ aT i½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
rj  cj ¼ 0
ow
osi
¼ T i þ aT j½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
acri
þ T j þ aT i½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
crj
 2/1si þ 2/2si þ 2/3sj ¼ 0
ow
osj
¼ T j þ aT i½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
acrj
þ T i þ aT j½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
cri
 2/1sj þ 2/2sj þ 2/3si ¼ 0
ðA:19Þ
The agent’s FOCs are as in Appendix 1, s o (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) remain valid. 
Inserting (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.19) gives
oui
oti
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Cri
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ ap ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞp  Cð1þ aÞ  ci ¼ 0
ouj
otj
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Crj
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ ap ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃtj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞp  Cð1þ aÞ  cj ¼ 0
ow
osi
¼ c
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ ap
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rj
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
p þ a ﬃﬃﬃripﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
p !
 cC  2½ð/1  /2Þsi  /3sj ¼ 0
ow
osj
¼ c
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ ap
ﬃﬃﬃ
ri
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
p þ a ﬃﬃﬃﬃrjpﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
p !
 cC  2½ð/1  /2Þsj  /3si ¼ 0
ðA:20Þ
Solving the ﬁrst equation in (A.20) with respect to
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
p
, solv-
ing the second equation with respect to
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
p
, and inserting
into the last two equations, gives two equations in si and sj. Solving these
two equations gives
si ¼ c½ð/1  /2Þðcj þ aciÞ þ /3ðci þ acjÞ
2ð/1  /2  /3Þð/1  /2 þ /3Þ
sj ¼ c½ð/1  /2Þðci þ acjÞ þ /3ðcj þ aciÞ
2ð/1  /2  /3Þð/1  /2 þ /3Þ
ðA:21Þ
Inserting (A.21) into the ﬁrst two equations in (A.20) and solving with respect to 
ti and tj gives
ti ¼ C
1 a
ri
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
 arj½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
!
 csj
tj ¼ C
1 a
rj
½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
 ari½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
!
 csi
ðA:22Þ
Inserting (A.21) and (A.22) into (A.3) and (A.4) and solving with respect to Ti 
and Tj gives
T i ¼ ð1þ aÞð1 aÞ
ciri
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
 acjrj½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
!
T j ¼ ð1þ aÞð1 aÞ
cjrj
½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
 aciri½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
! ðA:23Þ
which is equivalent to (A.8). Inserting into (4) and w = ui + uj gives
ui ¼ C½C þ cið1þ aÞ ri  citi  ð/1s
2
i  /2s2j  /3sisjÞ
uj ¼ C½C þ cjð1þ aÞ rj  cjtj  ð/1s
2
j  /2s2i  /3sisjÞ
w ¼ C½C þ cið1þ aÞ ri þ
C
½C þ cjð1þ aÞ rj
 citi  cjtj  ½ð/1  /2Þðs2i þ s2j Þ  2/3sisj
U ¼ ð1þ aÞ2 c
2
i ri
½C þ cið1þ aÞ2
þ c
2
j rj
½C þ cjð1þ aÞ2
!
ðA:24Þ
The aggregate attack and defense are the same as in (7). The symmetric case
becomes
t ¼ CrðC þ cð1þ aÞÞ2 
cð1þ aÞc2
2ð/1  /2  /3Þ
P 0
s ¼ cð1þ aÞc
2ð/1  /2  /3Þ
; T ¼ crð1þ aÞ½C þ cð1þ aÞ2
tAi ¼
Crð1þ aÞ
½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 ; T
A
i ¼
crð1þ aÞ2
½C þ cð1þ aÞ2 ;
tAi
T Ai
¼ C
cð1þ aÞ
u ¼ CðC þ caÞðC þ cð1þ aÞÞ2 r þ
c2ð1 a2Þc2
4ð/1  /2  /3Þ
; w ¼ 2u
U ¼ 2c
2rð1þ aÞ2
½C þ cð1þ aÞ2
ðA:25ÞAppendix 4. Social planner controls security investment: Simultaneous game, cf.
Section 7
The social planner’s FOCs are
ow
oti
¼ T i þ aT j½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
ri
þ T j þ aT i½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
arj  ci ¼ 0
ow
otj
¼ T j þ aT i½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
rj
þ T i þ aT j ari  cj ¼ 0
ðA:26Þ
½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
The remaining four FOCs are as in (A.1) and (A.2). Solving these gives
si ¼ ac½2ðci acjÞ/1þ ðcj aciÞ/3ð1 a2Þð2/1/3Þð2/1 þ/3Þ
; sj ¼ ac½2ðcj aciÞ/1 þ ðci acjÞ/3ð1 a2Þð2/1 /3Þð2/1þ/3Þ
ðA:27Þ
ti ¼ Cð1 aÞ ri½ðci acjÞ þCð1 aÞ2
 arj½ðcj aciÞ þCð1 aÞ2
!
 csj
tj ¼ Cð1 aÞ rj½ðcj aciÞ þCð1 aÞ2
 ari½ðci acjÞ þCð1 aÞ2
!
 csi
ðA:28Þ
T i ¼ riðci  acjÞ½ðci acjÞ þCð1 aÞ2
 arjðcj aciÞ½ðcj aciÞ þCð1 aÞ2
T j ¼ rjðcj aciÞ½ðcj aciÞ þCð1 aÞ2
 ariðci acjÞ½ðci acjÞ þCð1 aÞ2
ðA:29Þ
Inserting into (4) and w = ui + uj gives
ui ¼ Cð1 aÞ½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ ri  citi  ð/1s
2
i  /2s2j  /3sisjÞ
uj ¼ Cð1 aÞ½ðcj  aciÞ þ Cð1 aÞ rj  cjtj  ð/1s
2
j  /2s2i  /3sisjÞ
w ¼ ui þ uj
U ¼ ðci  acjÞ½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ ri þ
ðcj  aciÞ
½ðcj  aciÞ þ Cð1 aÞ rj  CðT i þ T jÞ
ðA:30ÞAppendix 5. Social planner controls both information sharing and security 
investment: simultaneous game, cf. Section 8.1
The social planner’s FOCs are
ow
oti
¼ T i þ aT j½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
ri
þ T j þ aT i½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
arj  ci ¼ 0
ow
otj
¼ T j þ aT i½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
rj
þ T i þ aT j½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
ari  cj ¼ 0
ow
osi
¼ T i þ aT j½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
acri
þ T j þ aT i½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
crj
 2/1si þ 2/2si þ 2/3sj ¼ 0
ow
osj
¼ T j þ aT i½tj þ csi þ T j þ aðti þ csj þ T iÞ2
acrj
þ T i þ aT j½ti þ csj þ T i þ aðtj þ csi þ T jÞ2
cri
 2/1sj þ 2/2sj þ 2/3si ¼ 0
ðA:31Þ
The agent’s FOCs are as in Appendix 1, so (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) remain valid.
Inserting (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.31) givesﬃﬃﬃ
ri
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
p þ a ﬃﬃﬃﬃrjpﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
p ¼ ci þ Cﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1þ ap
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rj
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
p þ a ﬃﬃﬃripﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
p ¼ cj þ Cﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1þ ap
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rj
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
p þ a ﬃﬃﬃripﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
p
¼ 2½ð/1  /2Þsi  /3sj þ cC
c
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1þ apﬃﬃﬃ
ri
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
p þ a ﬃﬃﬃﬃrjpﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
p
¼ 2½ð/1  /2Þsj  /3si þ cC
c
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1þ ap
ðA:32Þ
Equating the ﬁrst and fourth line in (A.32) gives an equation with si and sj. 
Equating the second and third line in (A.32) gives a second equation with si and 
sj. Solving these two equations gives
si ¼ c½ð/1/2Þcjþ/3ci
2ð/1 /2/3Þð/1/2 þ/3Þ
; sj ¼ c½ð/1/2Þciþ/3cj
2ð/1/2/3Þð/1/2 þ/3Þ
ðA:33Þ
Inserting (A.33) into (A.32) and solving with respect to ti and tj gives
ti ¼ Cð1 aÞ ri½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
 arj½ðcj  aciÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
!
 csj
tj ¼ Cð1 aÞ rj½ðcj  aciÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
 ari½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
!
 csi
ðA:34Þ
Inserting (A.33) and (A.34) into (A.3) and (A.4) and solving with respect to Ti 
and Tj gives
T i ¼ riðci  acjÞ½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
 arjðcj  aciÞ½ðcj  aciÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
T j ¼ rjðcj  aciÞ½ðcj  aciÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
 ariðci  acjÞ½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
ðA:35Þ
Inserting into (4) and w = ui + uj gives
ui ¼ Cð1 aÞ½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ ri  citi  ð/1s
2
i  /2s2j  /3sisjÞ
uj ¼ Cð1 aÞ½ðcj  aciÞ þ Cð1 aÞ rj  cjtj  ð/1s
2
j  /2s2i  /3sisjÞ
w ¼ Cð1 aÞ½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ ri þ
Cð1 aÞ
½ðcj  aciÞ þ Cð1 aÞ rj  citi  cjtj
 ½ð/1  /2Þðs2i þ s2j Þ  2/3sisj
U ¼ riðci  acjÞ½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ þ
rjðcj  aciÞ
½ðcj  aciÞ þ Cð1 aÞ
 Cð1 aÞ riðci  acjÞ½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
þ rjðcj  aciÞ½ðcj  aciÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
!
ðA:36Þ
The aggregate attack and defense are
tAi ¼
Crið1 aÞ2ð1þ aÞ
½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
; T Ai ¼
riðci  acjÞð1 a2Þ
½ðci  acjÞ þ Cð1 aÞ2
ðA:37Þ
The symmetric case becomes
t ¼ CrðC þ cÞ2 
cc2
2ð/1  /2  /3Þ
P 0
s ¼ cc
2ð/1  /2  /3Þ
; T ¼ cr½C þ c2
tAi ¼
Crð1þ aÞ
½C þ c2 ; T
A
i ¼
crð1þ aÞ
½C þ c2 ;
tAi
T Ai
¼ C
c
u ¼ C
2r
ðC þ cÞ2 þ
c2c2
4ð/1  /2  /3Þ
; w ¼ 2u; U ¼ 2c
2r
½C þ c2
ðA:38ÞAppendix 6. Social planner controls both information sharing and security 
investment: two period game, cf. Section 8.2
The agent’s FOCs for the second period are given by (A.2). Inserting (A.3)-
(A.4) into w = ui + uj, and determining the FOCs for the social planner for the 
ﬁrst period gives
ow
oti
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C
p
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ ap
ﬃﬃﬃ
ri
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
p þ a ﬃﬃﬃﬃrjpﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
p ! ci ¼ 0
ow
otj
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C
p
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ ap
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rj
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
p þ a ﬃﬃﬃripﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
p ! cj ¼ 0
ow
osi
¼ c
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C
p
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ ap
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rj
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
p þ a ﬃﬃﬃripﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
p !
 2/1si þ 2/2si þ 2/3sj ¼ 0
ow
osj
¼ c
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C
p
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ ap
ﬃﬃﬃ
ri
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ csj þ aðtj þ csiÞ
p þ a ﬃﬃﬃﬃrjpﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
tj þ csi þ aðti þ csjÞ
p !
 2/1sj þ 2/2sj þ 2/3si ¼ 0
ðA:39ÞSolving these and applying (A.3)-(A.4) gives (A.33) for information sharing, 
and
ti ¼ Cð1 aÞ
4
ri
ðci  acjÞ2
 arjðcj  aciÞ2
!
 csj
tj ¼ Cð1 aÞ
4
rj
ðcj  aciÞ2
 ariðci  acjÞ2
!
 csi ðA:40Þ
T i ¼ 1
4
ri½2ðci  acjÞ  Cð1 aÞ
ðci  acjÞ2
 arj½2ðcj  aciÞ  Cð1 aÞðcj  aciÞ2
!
T j ¼ 1
4
rj½2ðcj  aciÞ  Cð1 aÞ
ðcj  aciÞ2
 ari½2ðci  acjÞ  Cð1 aÞðci  acjÞ2
 !
ðA:41Þ
The proﬁts are
ui ¼ Cð1 aÞ
2ðci  acjÞ ri  citi  ð/1s
2
i  /2s2j  /3sisjÞ
uj ¼ Cð1 aÞ
2ðcj  aciÞ rj  cjtj  ð/1s
2
j  /2s2i  /3sisjÞ; w ¼ ui þ uj
U ¼ 1 Cð1 aÞ
2ðci  acjÞ
 
ri þ 1 Cð1 aÞ
2ðcj  aciÞ
 
rj  CðT i þ T jÞ
ðA:42Þ
References
Campbell, K., Gordon, L., Loeb, M., Zhou, L., 2003. The economic cost of publicly announced
information security breaches: Empirical evidence from the stock market. J. Comput. Security
11 (3), 431–448.
Cavusoglu, H., Mishra, B., Raghunathan, S., 2004. The eﬀect of internet security breach
announcements on shareholder wealth. Int. J. Electron. Commerce 9 (1), 69–104.
Gal-Or, E., 1985. Information sharing in oligopoly. Econometrica 53 (2), 329–343.
Gal-Or, E., Ghose, A., 2003. The economic consequences of sharing security information. In:
Proceedings of the Second Workshop on Economics and Information Security, May 29–30,
University of Maryland.
Gal-Or, E., Ghose, A., 2005. The economic incentives for sharing security information. Inform.
Syst. Res 16 (2), 186–208.
Ghose, A., 2007. Information disclosure and regulatory compliance: Economic issues and research
directions. In: Rao, H.R., Gupta, M., Upadhyaya, S. (Eds.), Managing information assurance
in ﬁnancial services, Idea Group.
Gordon, L.A., Loeb, M., 2001. Using information security as a response to competitor analysis
systems. Commun. ACM 44 (9), 70–75.
Gordon, L.A., Loeb, M., 2002. The economics of information security investment. ACM Trans.
Informat. Syst. Security 5 (4), 438–457.
Gordon, L.A., Loeb, M., 2003. Expenditures on competitor analysis and information security: A
managerial accounting perspective. In: Bhimani, A. (Ed.), Management Accounting in the New
Economy. Oxford University Press, pp. 95–111.
Gordon, L.A., Loeb, M., Lucyshyn, W., 2003. Sharing information on computer systems security:
An economic analysis. J. Account. Public Policy 22 (6), 461–485.
Gordon, L.A., Loeb, M., Lucyshyn, W., Richardson, R., 2006a. 2006 CSI/FBI computer crime and
security survey, http://www.gocsi.com/.
Gordon, L.A., Loeb, M., Lucyshyn, W., Sohail, T., 2006b. The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the
corporate disclosures of information security activities. J. Account. Public Policy 25 (5), 503–
530. Hausken, K., 2006a. Income, interdependence, and substitution eﬀects aﬀecting incentives for
security investment. J. Account. Public Policy 25 (6), 629–665.
Hausken, K., 2006b. Returns to information security investment: The eﬀect of alternative
information security breach functions on optimal investment and sensitivity to vulnerability.
Informat. Syst. Frontiers 8 (5), 338–349.
Kirby, A., 1988. Trade associations as information exchange mechanisms. RAND J. Econ. 29 (1),
138–146.
Kunreuther, H., Heal, G., 2003. Interdependent security. J. Risk Uncertainty 26 (2/3), 231–249. 
Novshek, W., Sonnenschein, H., 1982. Fulﬁlled expectations in cournot duopoly with information
acquisition and release. Bell J. Econ. 13 (1), 214–218.
Schechter, S., Smith, M., 2003. How much security is enough to stop a thief? In: Proceedings of the
Financial Cryptography Conference, Guadeloupe, January.
Schenk, M., Schenk, M., 2002. Deﬁning the value of strategic security. Secure Business Quart. 1 (1),
1–6.
Shapiro, C., 1986. Exchange of cost information in oligopoly. Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (3), 433–446. 
Skaperdas, S., 1996. Contest success functions. Econ. Theory 7, 283–290.
Tanaka, H., Matsuura, K., Sudoh, O., 2005. Vulnerability and information security investment: An
empirical analysis of E-local government in Japan. J. Account. Public Policy 24, 37–59. 
Vives, X., 1990. Trade association disclosure rules, incentives to share information, and welfare.
RAND J. Econ. 21 (3), 409–430.
Ziv, A., 1993. Information sharing in oligopoly: The truth-telling problem. RAND J. Econ. 24 (3),
455–465.
